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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States is seven years into an experiment with 
segregation in public education.  This experiment, unlike the race 
segregation the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Brown v. 
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Board of Education,1 is based on sex segregation.  The experiment has 
benefitted from a peculiar alliance of political forces: conservatives, 
who have long believed that separation of the sexes is natural and 
appropriate, and some liberal groups, who see separatism either as a 
tool of liberation or as the lesser of bad alternatives compared to a 
flawed coeducational system.  It resonates with a society that believes 
that men and women (and thus boys and girls), though equal, are 
inherently different. 
After seven years of experience with federally sanctioned sex-
segregated public education under the country’s belt, however, the 
arguments against sex segregation in public schools are even stronger 
than they were before the experiment began.  Like the inherently 
unjust system of de jure race segregation that existed in this country, 
the current experiment is also unconstitutional. 
In this Article, we argue that this experiment must come to an 
end because it is educationally unsound, fundamentally 
discriminatory, and patently unconstitutional.  We reach these 
conclusions by first reviewing the events that have led to state-
endorsed sex segregation in this country, the resulting expansion of 
such educational opportunities, and the legal developments since 
then.  We break down buzzword justifications such as “choice” and 
“diversity” and highlight new research into brain differences (or lack 
thereof), educational outcomes, and sex stereotyping.  In the process, 
we hold this expansion to the rigorous heightened scrutiny test 
employed by the Supreme Court for sex classifications and find that, 
like segregation based on race, segregating students based on sex 
violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
This Article is organized as follows: in Part II, we trace the rise of 
single-sex schools and classes since the new Department of Education 
(ED) regulations in 2006.  This section depicts the political cauldron 
in which these regulations arose and are being implemented. On one 
side, several prominent organizations are promoting single-sex 
education throughout the country; on the other side, some national 
women’s rights organizations are working to bring the empirical 
literature on the harms of single-sex education to light and to lobby 
for rescission of the ED regulations.  The section also introduces the 
three recent cases that federal courts have decided regarding the 
constitutionality of single-sex schools pursuant to the new ED 
regulations and situates them within the constitutional doctrine of 
 
 1  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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sex classifications. 
Parts III and IV take their cue from that doctrine by first 
analyzing the asserted purposes behind sex-segregated education and 
then exposing the ways that separating boys and girls reinforces 
stereotypes and perpetuates hierarchy.  In particular, in Part III, we 
dissect the four main arguments used by supporters of sex 
segregation: (1) that sex segregation creates a diversity of educational 
offerings and that parents deserve to have choice among these 
options; (2) that brain research supports separating boys and girls; 
(3) that sex segregation improves educational outcomes; and (4) that 
sex segregation allows boys and girls to break out of sex-based 
stereotypes.  Because it is the most commonly articulated, we spend 
the most time on the first argument about choice and diversity, 
demonstrating that the constitutional concept of “diversity” was never 
intended to allow segregation and that choice does not wash away the 
constitutional problem of state-sponsored segregation.  Addressing 
this argument as well as the other three, we demonstrate that there is 
at best insignificant support for sex segregation and, at worst, no 
support whatsoever. 
In Part IV, we move to an evaluation of the harms that sex-
segregated education causes, an important part of the Supreme 
Court’s consideration of sex classifications.  We argue that sex-
segregated education promotes an essentialized view of what it means 
to be a boy or girl, something the Court has consistently cautioned 
against in its warnings about “outmoded stereotypes.”  Moreover, sex 
segregation perpetuates existing sex-based hierarchies, another 
concern within the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Ultimately, we 
conclude that sex segregation is a form of sex essentialism, something 
the Constitution prohibits when based on the flimsy justifications 
offered here. 
II. REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS 
Ten years ago, only “about a dozen public schools” in the United 
States offered single-sex classrooms.2  According to the National 
Association for Single-Sex Public Education, during the 2011–12 
school year, 116 public schools across the country were completely 
single-sex and 390 more had single-sex classes for some subjects.3  
 
 2  Single-Sex Schools/Schools with Single-Sex Classrooms/What’s the Difference?, NAT’L 
ASS’N FOR SINGLE SEX PUB. EDUC., http://www.singlesexschools.org 
/schools-schools.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 3  Id. 
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The number, however, may be much higher than that.  The Feminist 
Majority Foundation’s own data indicate that over 1,000 public 
schools in the United States had sex-segregated classes between 2007 
and 2010,4 and the United States Department of Education counts 
over 5,000.5 
Regardless of the specific number, it is clear that by all counts 
single-sex education in the United States has seen a huge increase 
over the past decade.  There are many reasons for the increase, but 
part of the reason is that the federal government gave single-sex 
education its blessing in 2006.  That year, after first being prompted 
by a provision in President Bush’s signature No Child Left Behind 
Act,6 the Department of Education created regulations allowing 
single-sex schools and classes if student enrollment is “completely 
voluntary,” “substantially equal” coeducational classes are available in 
the same subject, and the single-sex classes are “substantially related” 
to an important educational objective.7 
Many organizations have worked to spread single-sex education 
throughout the country.  Foremost among them are Leonard Sax’s 
National Association for Choice in Education (which had been the 
National Association for Single-Sex Public Education until November 
2011) and Michael Gurian’s Gurian Institute.  Both work with schools 
and school districts to expand and then implement single-sex 
education.  The National Association for Choice in Education 
explains that its mission is to “promote and support girls’ schools and 
boys’ schools, whether in the public sector, private sector, or Catholic 
sector.”8  The Gurian Institute promotes single-sex schools and 
classrooms by “providing professional development that increases 
 
 4  Sue Klein, State of Public School Sex Segregation in the United States 2007-2010: Part 
I: Patterns of K-12 Single-sex Public Education in the U.S., FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION 
14 (2012), http://www.feminist.org/education/pdfs
/sex_segregation_study_part1.pdf. 
 5  The Feminist Majority Foundation questions the legitimacy of this number 
because of unusually large numbers from Florida and New York in the Department 
of Education data.  Id. at 14–15. 
 6  Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1112(c)(1)(G), 115 Stat. 1425,1465 (codified at 20 
U.S.C. § 6312(c)(1)(g) (2006)). 
 7  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530 (Oct. 25, 2006) (codified 
as amended at 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(4) (2008)).  For a more in depth review of the 
2006 regulatory change, see Diane Heckman, Title IX Marks Its 35th Anniversary by 
Opening the Doors to Single-Sex Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 237 EDUC. L. REP. 
1, 20–25 (Nov. 27, 2008). 
 8  NAT’L ASS’N FOR CHOICE IN EDUC., http://www.4schoolchoice.org/ (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2014). 
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student achievement, teacher effectiveness, and parent involvement.”9 
The expansion of single-sex education since the 2006 
regulations has not gone unchallenged.  Several women’s rights 
organizations have worked tirelessly to oppose the expansion of 
single-sex education and to convince the Department of Education to 
rescind its regulations.  The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
and the Feminist Majority Foundation have taken the lead in this 
area.10  Beyond the litigation that it has brought (described in more 
detail below), the ACLU launched its “Teach Kids, Not Stereotypes” 
campaign in May 2012.  As part of that campaign, fifteen ACLU state 
affiliates sent letters to discern exactly what states and local school 
districts were doing with respect to single-sex education.11  From that 
effort, the ACLU issued a report later in 2012 detailing how “single-
sex education programs within coeducational schools are widely out 
of compliance with the stringent legal requirements governing 
separation of students on the basis of sex, mandated by the United 
States Constitution, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
and the Department of Education’s (ED) Title IX regulations.”12  In 
particular, the ACLU found that the programs were premised on a 
belief in the innate differences between boys and girls, that sex-based 
stereotypes drove the educational models used, that schools did not 
have any justification for segregating the sexes, that some programs 
were not voluntary (as required by law), and that schools were 
neither assessing the efficacy of their programs nor ensuring that the 
programs were not based on stereotypes.13  From these findings, the 
ACLU took action against several programs, including sending 
letters, filing administrative complaints, and instituting one lawsuit.14 
 
 9  GURIAN INST., http://www.michaelgurian.com/education.html (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2014). 
 10  This is not to diminish the roles that other organizations have played in the 
fight against single-sex education.  The Women’s Law Project, the National Women’s 
Law Center, the National Organization for Women, and others have worked on this 
issue as well. 
 11  Teach Kids, Not Stereotypes, ACLU (Mar. 28 2013), 
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/teach-kids-not-stereotypes (stating that ACLU 
affiliates in Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, 
Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin “sent public records requests to states, school districts, and 
individual schools seeking documents related to the implementation of single-sex 
education programs”). 
 12  Preliminary Findings of ACLU “Teach Kids, Not Stereotypes” Campaign, ACLU 3 
(2012), http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/doe_ocr_report2_0.pdf. 
 13  Id. at 3–4. 
 14  Details about the various complaints can be found at the ACLU’s website.  See 
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The Feminist Majority Foundation’s approach focused more in 
the areas of lobbying and educational reform.  It has worked to try to 
get the ED to rescind its 2006 regulations.  The Feminist Majority 
Foundation also has done a comprehensive study of sex segregation 
in public schools across the country.  Not only did the report compile 
the data above, but it also analyzed patterns in sex-segregated 
education, considered state involvement in single-sex programs, and 
developed recommendations for eliminating single-sex education 
and creating more gender equity in schooling.15 
So far, this advocacy has resulted in some schools voluntarily 
changing plans as well as some litigation.  Three cases have reached 
the federal courts and resulted in decisions.  One of the cases arose 
out of Vermilion Parish, Louisiana.  In that case, the mother of two 
students objected to her daughters attending “core classes in which 
only girls were allowed.”16  At first, the classes were mandatory, but 
the school changed to voluntary classes upon being told that 
mandatory single-sex classes were against the law.17  The mother of 
the two students continued to object, however, because the co-ed 
classes had students of inferior quality in them and used educational 
strategies designed to “tailor learning toward the strengths and needs 
of boys or girls.”18 
The mother filed suit based on these differences and initially lost 
in federal district court.  The court reasoned that the school district 
did not intend to discriminate against girls, so there was no violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.19  As a result, the district court denied 
the mother’s request for a preliminary injunction halting single-sex 
education during the pendency of the lawsuit.  On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction for 
procedural reasons,20 but disagreed about the legal reasoning.  The 
court correctly explained that when a school segregates based on sex, 
there is no requirement of proof of discriminatory intent and the 
 
Teach Kids, supra note 11.  
 15  State of Public School Sex Segregation in the United States, FEMINIST MAJORITY 
FOUNDATION (2012), http://www.feminist.org/education/SexSegregation.asp.  
 16  Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App’x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 17  Id. at 369. 
 18  Id. at 371. 
 19  Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., No. 10-30378, 2010 WL 440637 at *5 (W.D. 
La. Apr. 19, 2010) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order).  
 20  Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App’x at 376 (explaining that the potential 
mootness of injunctive relief necessitated denying the preliminary injunction). 
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court must apply intermediate scrutiny.21  The court remanded the 
case to the district court for further proceedings in light of its ruling, 
but a month after the Fifth Circuit decision, the school district voted 
to end single-sex education, citing lack of parental interest.22 
Although the Vermilion Parish case resulted in no decision on 
the merits, two other cases did.  Breckinridge, Kentucky began sex 
segregation in the classroom in 2007.23  Several students objected to 
the mere fact of sex segregation.24  After some initial procedural 
decisions, the district court certified a class action but then dismissed 
the case because it found there was no constitutionally cognizable 
injury in separating classes based on sex.  The court concluded that 
“[t]he Supreme Court has never held that separating students by sex 
in a public school—unlike separating students by race—or offering a 
single-sex public institution is per se unconstitutional.”25  For 
unknown reasons, the ACLU did not appeal this case. 
The other decision came out of West Virginia.  In that case, the 
Wood County Board of Education adopted a single-sex educational 
program in their middle schools in which students were placed in 
single-sex classes but parents could opt out of the classes.26  A parent 
of three girls challenged the program for not being “completely 
voluntary,” as required by the 2006 regulations.27  The district court 
agreed, finding that in order for there to be “voluntary” participation, 
there must be “clear and affirmative assent” by the child’s parent or 
guardian.28  Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiffs’ request for 
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the school from having opt-out 
single-sex education.  The court, however, did not grant the 
plaintiffs’ request for an injunction prohibiting all single-sex 
education.  It concluded that a single-sex educational program could 
comply with the Constitution and Title IX “if the school meets the 
heightened scrutiny set forth” in Supreme Court precedent about sex 
 
 21  Id. at 372. 
 22  Vermilion Parish School to Halt Single Sex Program, FEMINIST MAJORITY 
FOUNDATION BLOG (Oct. 18, 2011), http://feminist.org/blog/index.php/2011
/10/18/vermilion-parish-school-to-halt-single-sex-program/. 
 23  A.N.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 673, 675 (W.D. Ky. 
2011). 
 24  Id. at 675–76. 
 25  Id. at 678. 
 26  Doe v. Wood Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 888 F. Supp. 2d 771, 777 (S.D. W. Va. 2012). 
 27  34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(ii) (requiring “student enrollment in a single-sex 
class” to be “completely voluntary”). 
 28  Wood Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 888 F. Supp. 2d at 776. 
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discrimination.29 
With the Louisiana case settled, the Kentucky case not appealed, 
and the West Virginia case limited to its particular circumstances, no 
federal court case is poised to reach the Supreme Court and decide 
the issue in the near future.  As these three decisions indicate, 
however, cases regarding the constitutionality of single-sex education 
under the new ED regulations are beginning to percolate through 
the federal courts.  The matter will inevitably reach the U.S. Supreme 
Court to finally address the issue it has left open for almost four 
decades. 
Despite the recent increase in single-sex education and the 
litigation it has spawned, we still face the legal landscape we have 
been in for a while now—without an authoritative statement about 
the constitutionality of single-sex education.  The Supreme Court has 
not previously answered whether the Constitution allows for single-
sex public education.  In 1977, the Supreme Court heard a case that 
squarely presented the issue, but with Justice Rehnquist sitting out of 
the case because of a back problem, the Court evenly divided, which 
meant there was no opinion and no precedent created by the case.30  
Since then, the Court has twice struck down public sex-segregated 
education, but the cases were both unique and hard to generalize.  
The first case involved an all-female graduate nursing school in 
Mississippi, which the Court found unconstitutional because it relied 
on stereotypes about men’s and women’s employment.31  The second 
case involved an all-male military college in Virginia, which the Court 
found unconstitutional because the state also relied on stereotypes in 
assuming that no women would be interested in or able to complete 
the training.32 
Proponents of single-sex education point to language in the 
Virginia case to support their view that single-sex education can be 
constitutional.  In that case, writing for herself and six other justices, 
Justice Ginsburg explained that the Court does “not question the 
Commonwealth’s prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse 
educational opportunities.”33  She also seemed to endorse the view 
that single-sex education “affords pedagogical benefits to at least 
 
 29  Id. at 779. 
 30  Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (affirming by an evenly divided 
Court the Thid Circuit’s decision). 
 31  Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725–31 (1982). 
 32  United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 527–28 (1996). 
 33  Id. at 533 n.7. 
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some students” and that “diversity among public educational 
institutions can serve the public good.”34  Moreover, she explained in 
the opinion that “inherent differences” between men and women 
“remain cause for celebration” and can be the basis for sex-based 
classifications that compensate women for past discrimination, 
promote equal opportunity, or “advance full development of the 
talent and capacities of our Nation’s people.”35  What is prohibited, 
Justice Ginsburg further explained, is when sex-based classifications 
“create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of 
women.” 
Given the standard of review for sex classifications that United 
States v. Virginia (VMI) established, however, single-sex education 
cannot pass constitutional muster.  As the Court has clearly 
articulated over the course of almost four decades now, in order for a 
sex classification to survive constitutional scrutiny, the government 
must show “at least that the [challenged] classification serves 
‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory 
means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.’”36 
Breaking down this test makes clear that a sex classification must 
have a strong enough justification and the means used must be 
closely related to that justification.  As the next two sections will set 
forth, sex-segregated education fails both prongs of this test.  With 
respect to the objective, the Court wrote that the government must 
have an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for a sex classification.37  
The government’s justifications must be “genuine” rather than 
“invented post hoc in response to litigation.”38  With respect to the 
means used, the Court warned about the harms that sex classification 
can inflict when not properly tailored to exceedingly persuasive goals.  
It explained that the sex classification cannot use or further 
“overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences of males and females,”39 nor can it “create or perpetuate 
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”40  These 
admonitions establish a straightforward framework with which to 
 
 34  Id. at 535. 
 35  Id. at 533. 
 36  Id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
 37  Id.   
 38  VMI, 518 U.S. at 533. 
 39  Id.  
 40  Id. at 534. 
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analyze sex- segregated education, which the next two sections follow. 
III. NO EXCEEDINGLY PERSUASIVE JUSTIFICATION EXISTS FOR SINGLE-
SEX EDUCATION 
Single-sex education does not meet the standards set forth in 
VMI.41  First, as this section will make clear, there is no “exceedingly 
persuasive justification” for single-sex education.  Each of the 
arguments that supporters advance in favor of single-sex education is 
flawed, which we demonstrate below.  We will then show in Part IV 
that single-sex education also fails with respect to Justice Ginsburg’s 
two other concerns.  It relies on stereotypes of boys and girls that try 
to fit them into an essentialist view of gender and sex, and it 
perpetuates male dominance over women and girls. 
A. Diversity, Choice, and the Equal Protection Limits on Liberty 
1.  Single-sex Programs Encourage Homogeneity, Not 
Diversity 
Proponents originally promoted single-sex education as a 
measure to encourage educational diversity.42  In United States v. 
Virginia, the Commonwealth argued that “the option of single-sex 
education contributes to ‘diversity in educational approaches.’”43  
Diversity was an argument that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected in 
the VMI case in part because the justification was a post hoc 
rationalization “invented . . . in response to litigation” and not one of 
Virginia’s initial objectives,44 but also because both “recent” and 
“distant history” tied such education to the larger social separation of 
the sexes, impediments to advancement for women, and sexual 
 
 41  By breaking up the constitutional standard this way, we are not claiming that 
the constitutional standard always has these three separate elements: 1) sufficient 
justification; 2) no stereotyping; 3) no perpetuation of inferiority of women.  As the 
Court looks at sex classifications, each of these aspects is a different part of analyzing 
the basic intermediate scrutiny standard that a classification must be substantially 
related to an exceedingly persuasive government purpose.  We organize the analysis 
in this way because Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in VMI focuses on these different 
aspects of how a government classification can fail intermediate scrutiny. 
 42  See, e.g., Brief of Twenty-Six Private Women’s Colleges as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at *5, VMI, 518 U.S. 515 (Nos. 94-1941, 94-2107), 1995 WL 
702837 (arguing that single-sex schools can promote diversity by “dissipat[ing], 
rather than perpetuat[ing], traditional gender classifications”).  
 43  VMI, 518 U.S. at 535. 
 44  Id. at 533; see also id. at 535 (“Virginia has not shown that VMI was established, 
or has been maintained, with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of 
women, educational opportunities within the Commonwealth.”). 
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stereotyping.45  Although the Court left open the question of states’ 
“prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational 
opportunities,” including single-sex education,46 it recognized that 
diversity could not be a trump card to escape equal protection 
scrutiny.47 
The 2006 ED regulations picked up on the diversity theme in 
authorizing schools to implement single-sex classes or extracurricular 
activities to “provide diverse educational opportunities” for students.48  
Yet, as Professor Juliet Williams points out, the diversity provision of 
the regulations is self-justifying: 
Some commenters stated that there is not an important 
governmental interest in a sex-based educational option as 
a diverse option without a requirement that the recipient 
demonstrate that the single-sex option advances 
educational goals, because otherwise the single-sex nature 
of the class would always be justified as substantially related 
to achievement of the objective, which is circular.49 
While there is no question that single-sex schools or classes 
would increase the array of available public educational offerings, 
programmatic diversity or increased educational options for parents 
is not the same thing as the concept of diversity that has been 
recognized in other constitutional contexts.  In the context of race-
based affirmative action, the U.S. Supreme Court has been careful to 
delimit what constitutionally permissible diversity means.  Starting in 
1978 with Regents of the University of California v. Bakke50 and continuing 
through the most recent case of Fisher v. University of Texas, the U.S. 
 
 45  Id. at 535–40. 
 46  Id. at 533 n.7. 
 47  Id. at 529 (“The [appeals] court recognized that, as it analyzed the case, 
means merged into end,” effectively “bypass[ing] any equal protection scrutiny.”). 
 48  34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(i)(A), (B) (2007). 
(A) To improve educational achievement of its students, through a 
recipient’s overall established policy to provide diverse educational 
opportunities, provided that the single-sex nature of the class or 
extracurricular activity is substantially related to achieving that 
objective; or (B) To meet the particular, identified educational needs 
of its students, provided that the single-sex nature of the class or 
extracurricular activity is substantially related to achieving that 
objective.  
Id. 
 49  Juliet A. Williams, Learning Differences: Sex-Role Stereotyping in Single-Sex Public 
Education, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 555, 570 n.82 (2010) (quoting Single-Sex Rules 
Final Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,529, 62,534 (Oct. 25, 2006)). 
 50  Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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Supreme Court has approved the idea of educational institutions 
admitting students with diverse backgrounds to promote the 
educational experience of students.51  But in each of these cases, this 
concept of diversity was premised on inclusion, not exclusion,52 and it 
looked at the different cultural, racial, ethnic, and other experiences 
of students who would then bring a wide variety of perspectives into 
the classroom.53  The point was to encourage students to become 
aware of other people who are not like themselves. 
In 2003, in Grutter v. Bollinger, the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that viewpoint diversity could be a compelling interest for 
an educational institution.54  The Grutter Court, however, insisted that 
admissions processes not reduce applicants to single dimensions of 
their identity and instead “ensure that each applicant is evaluated as 
an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or 
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.”55  In 2007 in 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, the 
Court warned that a simple label of “diversity” does not excuse a 
“patently unconstitutional” program of “racial balancing.”56  Finally, 
last year in Fisher v. University of Texas, in the affirmative action 
context, the Court held that to the extent that obtaining a diverse 
student body remains a compelling state interest, the educational 
institution must first demonstrate that “no workable race-neutral 
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”57 
Although the standard for diversity in the context of sex-based 
 
 51  Id. at 315 (approving the medical school’s concept of trying to obtain a 
student body that “encompasses a . . . broa[d] array of qualifications and 
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important 
element”); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (recognizing that 
viewpoint diversity could be a compelling interest); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013) (holding that diversity can be a compelling interest but 
that the university must first demonstrate that “no workable race-neutral alternatives 
would produce the educational benefits of diversity”). 
 52  See Mary M. Cheh, An Essay on VMI and Military Service: Yes, We Do Have to Be 
Equal Together, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 60–61 (1993). 
 53  See Robert N. Davis, Diversity: The Emerging Modern Separate But Equal Doctrine, 1 
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 11, 28 (1994). 
 54  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.  
 55  Id. at 337. 
 56  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732 
(2007).  Parents Involved mandated that diversity be considered only as a means 
toward pedagogic ends and demanded evidence that the district could not produce 
about the effect of various different minority group percentages on educational 
outcomes.  Id. at 727–28. 
 57  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013). 
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affirmative action may differ,58 the guiding principles regarding 
diversity should not be markedly different. “Diversity,” as it is used in 
the context of single-sex education, attempts to ride the coattails of a 
permissible educational objective, but it violates all of the precepts on 
which the constitutional concept rests.  Unlike in the race-based 
affirmative action cases, such as Parents Involved in Community Schools,59 
diversity in the single-sex education context is merely a label.  Unlike 
in Grutter, single-sex education focuses on only one dimension of 
identity—sex—and that dimension becomes the defining feature of 
the individual. Unlike in Bakke, single-sex education does not 
emphasize ensuring a variety of fellow travelers who would enrich the 
classroom with different perspectives and experiences, but instead is 
used to promote the exclusion of one sex, which is precisely the 
opposite of diversity.60 
If a school district creates single-sex classes or schools, the 
students experience no gender diversity within the 
individual school or classroom. In fact, it is precisely 
homogeneity that is sought.  The diversity interest is simply 
an interest in segregation . . . .  [A] student body that is 
absolutely the same on the basis of sex does not promote 
diversity. 
 
 58  See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam).  This is the odd 
byproduct of affirmative action doctrine that Justice Stevens points out in his 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena dissent:  
[A]s the law currently stands, the Court will apply ‘intermediate 
scrutiny” to cases of invidious gender discrimination and “strict 
scrutiny” to cases of invidious race discrimination, while applying the 
same standard for benign classifications as for invidious ones. If this 
remains the law, then today’s lecture about “consistency” will produce 
the anomalous result that the Government can more easily enact 
affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination against women 
than it can enact affirmative action programs to remedy discrimination 
against African-Americans—even though the primary purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the former 
slaves. 
515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 59  Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 60  Interestingly, as Australia moves away from single sex schools toward a 
majority of students attending co-ed secondary schools, the diversity argument is 
used the other way.  Dr. Peter Lennox, the headmaster of a premier secondary 
school in Australia, says, “‘Co-education prepares students for real life . . . unless 
parents have ambitions for their children to end up in a single-sex environment, 
such as a monastery or jail.’”  Melinda Hamm, The Great Gender Debate, SUN-HERALD 
(Austl.), Feb. 24, 2013, at 1.  He added that in co-ed schools, “girls and boys learn 
and work in an environment where they face a diversity of ideas and perceptions that 
they would tend not to get in a single-sex school.”  Id. 
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. . . . 
Nor is the same-sex educational choice diverse in the sense 
of larger social experiences, given the pervasiveness of sex 
segregation in society.  Diversity in the single-sex education 
debate, then, refers not to genuine diversity on an 
experiential level (within the classroom) or the broader 
societal level, but only to diversity at a narrow level of 
middle management. Diversity in this context means only 
sameness along the only dimension (gender) that is 
examined.  The logic of the diversity argument becomes 
Orwellian in its implicit contradictions: sameness is 
diversity.61 
In short, it is preposterous, almost insulting, to argue that 
segregation and exclusion fit under the mantle of diversity.  
Unpacked, the diversity argument essentially collapses into what is 
now the school choice argument—that parents should be able to 
choose among a “diverse” array of educational options for their 
children.  It is to this argument that we turn next. 
2. Choice Does Not Cure the Constitutional Violation 
Given that state-sponsored segregation by sex would be a 
violation of equal protection if it were the exclusive and mandatory 
educational option, proponents nonetheless argue that parents 
should be able to choose single-sex classes or schools for their 
children.62  “Parental choice,” though, is not an answer to the equal 
protection problem posed by state-sponsored sex segregation.  For 
equal protection analysis, choice does not answer the pre-existing 
constitutional question: whether there is “an exceedingly persuasive 
justification” for public funds to be used in support of sex segregation 
in the first place.63  Whether that justification exists depends on the 
empirical evidence of the efficacy of single-sex education.64 
Equal protection jurisprudence draws a clear distinction 
 
 61  Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long Term 
Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 520 (1999). 
 62  See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities 
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,098 (proposed May 8, 2002) 
(codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) (noting the Department of Education’s intent “to 
expand the choices parents have for their children’s education”); Marcia Sills, Same-
Sex Classes Argued, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Nov. 9, 2009, at A1 (quoting the founder of 
the National Association for Single Sex Public Education, now called the National 
Association for Choice in Education, Dr. Leonard Sax, as saying: “We think parents 
should have a choice of a coeducational or single-sex classroom.”). 
 63  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
 64  See infra notes 138–193 and accompanying text. 
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between schooling choices that may be created in the private sphere 
and those that can be offered in public schools.  Consider Roman 
Catholic catechism drills.  Offering them in public school violates 
freedom of religion.  Offering them in a private school, which does 
not receive state funds, does not.  The constitutional issue in public 
schools is not eliminated by allowing parents to choose to enroll their 
child in the catechism classes, rather than mandating them.  Indeed, 
the constitutional problem is not eliminated by offering a menu of 
options, including Atheism Rituals alongside the Tao.  As we 
demonstrate below, single-sex education violates the Equal Protection 
Clause, and given that, parental choice does not immunize the 
consequences. 
i. The History of Parental Choice 
The “choice” argument is seductive and superficially quite 
appealing.  There is such a strong tradition in this country of 
respecting parental choices—in, among other areas, medical 
treatment, vaccinations, religious inculcation, homeschooling, and 
grandparent visitation65—that on the surface this answer seems 
sensible.  Most Americans probably believe parents should have a 
large say in steering the education of their children.  Parents know a 
lot about their children and what their children need, and the 
government should respect differences in child-rearing choices.  
While the Supreme Court has recognized a liberty interest in giving 
parents some educational options for their children, the reasoning 
underlying these decisions does not support allowing parents to 
choose publicly funded schools segregated on the basis of sex. 
Parents may comply with compulsory education laws by choosing 
private schools.66  The 1920s cases permitting this, Meyer v. Nebraska67 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,68 are often cited for the sweeping 
proposition that parents have unfettered authority to direct their 
children’s education.69  But the factual contexts in which these cases 
arose are important.  Meyer held that a state, acting out of prejudice 
 
 65  See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 
(1979); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
 66  See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 67  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 68  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 69  See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. 
Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Public Single-Sex Schools, 1999 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 381,  444 n.253. 
LEVIT/COHEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:06 PM 
354 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:339 
 
and ignorance, could not prohibit private Lutheran schools from 
teaching German.70  Pierce held that a state could not compel parents 
to send their children to public instead of private schools.71  
Importantly, neither case dealt with a constitutional obstacle to 
offering a particular type of education; the Equal Protection Clause 
presents that obstacle to sex-based classifications.  The difficulty with 
using Meyer and Pierce as precedent to support state-funded single-sex 
schools is that neither case is about parents having an interest in the 
state offering a discriminatory option.72  After all, the religious 
schools in Meyer and Pierce were purely private. 
The other Supreme Court cases about school choice also arose 
from completely different factual circumstances.  Both Wisconsin v. 
Yoder73 and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris74 show the Court endorsing 
private religious education, not the state directly endorsing or 
supporting specific forms of religious education.75  This does not 
mean that parents have a constitutionally valued interest in the state 
offering educational opportunities that violate the Constitution. 
 
 70  The state passed the statute during a wave of anti-German sentiment following 
the first World War: “[T]he adoption of the statute was animated by fears that 
children raised in foreign households speaking another language as their mother 
tongue would develop into unreliable citizens.”  Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, 
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1264 (2010); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 (“No 
emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of some language other 
than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the consequent 
infringement of rights long freely enjoyed.”); see also Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive 
Due Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to Troxel v. Granville, 8 J. L. & 
FAM. STUD. 71, 77 (2006) (“[T]he problem in Meyer is not state interference in the 
intimacies of home and family, but, rather the state’s attempt to limit the acquisition 
of knowledge and homogenize its populace.”). 
 71  Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35 (holding unconstitutional an Oregon law that 
compelled parents to send their children to public instead of private schools).  
 72  Pierce simply says that the state cannot stop a family from going to Catholic 
school, id.; but of course the state cannot on its own offer a Catholic public 
education in the name of individual liberty because that would violate the 
Establishment Clause.  The parallel to single-sex education is that the state cannot 
prohibit students from attending a sex-segregated private school, but it also can’t 
offer one itself.  
 73  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 74  Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); see Verna L. Williams, Private 
Choices, Public Consequences: Public Education Reform and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 563, 570 (2006)  (“Underlying the Court’s opinion, however, is 
the notion that the program and private choice were necessary for the educational 
benefit of poor minority children. More specifically, accepting the hyperbolic 
question presented by petitioners at face value, it appears that on a certain level the 
Court approved the voucher program because it was ‘designed to rescue 
economically disadvantaged children from a failing public school system.’”).  
 75  Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652–53. 
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The single-sex schools issue counterpoises the liberty interests of 
parents against the equality interests implicated when public funds 
directly support segregation based on identity characteristics.  In the 
Establishment Clause arena, providing parent choice keeps the wall 
of separation between church and state intact, as parents are allowed 
to take their children out of the public school system and enroll them 
in schools in the private sphere to make choices among religious 
schools.  In contrast, in the equal protection context, the question is 
whether public funds can directly establish sex-segregated 
alternatives.  We argue that public funding of sex segregation is 
wrong, and parents should not be allowed to choose an option that is 
not demonstrably constitutional. 
ii. The Difficulties With Choice in Operation 
Moving from the abstract idea of “choice” to the ways in which 
choices play out in the single-sex schools context emphasizes the 
constitutional problem of allowing parental choices to control.  Dean 
Martha Minow observed that one of the difficulties of choice is that it 
can imply neutrality, all while “effectively tilting in particular 
directions.”76 
Choice may seem to put all options on the table, yet it is not 
neutral.  It converts schooling to private desires.  It obscures 
continuing inequalities in access and need; it invites self-
separation unless collectively controlled.  It treats the 
aggregation of separate decisions as free when the result so 
often impedes freedom and equality.77 
The U.S. Supreme Court has already addressed the value of 
parental choice when it serves segregative purposes in education.  In 
1968, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a “freedom of choice” plan in 
Green v. County School Board for New Kent County.78  The school board 
had implemented a desegregation plan that permitted parents to 
choose the school their children would attend; these parental choices 
resulted in all-black and all-white schools.  The personal liberty trope 
was a huge part of the segregationists’ argument in the 1950s and 
1960s, but the Green Court recognized that the “freedom of choice” 
plan was a mockery, because no white parents ever chose to send 
their children to a “Negro” school.  Thus, the Court recognized that 
 
 76  Martha Minow, Confronting the Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American 
Pluralism, 120 YALE L.J. 814, 817 (2011). 
 77  Id. at 848. 
 78  Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. for New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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permitting parental choice would undermine the integration 
mandate of Brown.79  The importance of Green to the constitutional 
questions raised by single-sex schools is that the decision makes clear 
that choice is really a means, not an end in itself.80  The central 
consideration is the end to which choice is directed, and if choice is 
being used in the service of government-sponsored segregation, the 
equal protection parameters control.  Personal liberty has limits that 
are dictated by other constitutional provisions, and personal liberty is 
constrained when it violates equal protection guarantees.  
All three of the federal cases evaluating the constitutionality of 
sex segregation after the ED regulations have considered the issue of 
parental choice.  The most recent, and perhaps least controversial of 
these decisions, is Doe v. Wood County Board of Education.81  There, a 
federal district court in West Virginia enjoined Van Devender Middle 
School’s program of creating single-sex classes for math, reading, 
science, and social studies under an opt-out system.82  The court 
emphasized repeatedly that the particular opt-out system was not 
truly voluntary, as required by the ED regulations.83  Complicating the 
voluntariness inquiry in Wood County Board of Education were both the 
timing of the opt-out notice and the consequences for individual 
students of a decision to opt out.84 
The school’s notices gave parents little time to reflect on or to 
consider the opt-out option, so the court concluded that “[t]he close 
proximity of the notices to the beginning of the school year, after 
students have already enrolled, suggest that their choice was not fully 
voluntary.”85  If a particular student did choose to opt out, that 
 
 79  Id. at 432–39.  
 80  Id. at 440 (“‘Freedom of choice’ is not a sacred talisman; it is only a means to a 
constitutionally required end—the abolition of the system of segregation and its 
effects.”). 
 81  Doe v. Wood Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 888 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D. W. Va. 2012). 
 82  Id. at 780.  
 83  Id. at 775–77 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1)(iii) 
(2006)).  
 84  Id. at 777.  The decision to opt out cannot be an easy one for students.  By 
segregating based on sex in order to achieve better educational outcomes, the school 
is sending a clear message that the segregated classrooms are better than the status 
quo.  A student opting out would be saying that she does not want to participate in 
these better classrooms.  This dynamic would place intense pressure on students not 
to opt out, even if they are not personally interested in the sex-segregated class. 
 85  Id. at 777. 
For the 2012–13 school year, the record establishes that a meeting was 
held on August 16, 2012 with a form giving parents the option to opt-
out. A phone recording was sent to parents the night before school 
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student “would be sent to a different school if not enough students at 
VDMS opted to take a coeducational class.”86  Ultimately, neither the 
timing nor the punitive nature of the opt-out structure was 
determinative for the court, because the court found that the opt-out 
provision was essentially the opposite of a “completely voluntary 
program,” which required, according to the court, “unequivocal 
assent to participation given by parents of all students involved.”87 
The second of the three federal decisions entailed a federal 
district court that wholeheartedly embraced the choice rationale.  In 
A.N.A. v. Breckinridge,88 the U.S. District Court for the Western District 
of Kentucky reasoned that “optional single-sex programs in public 
schools” were constitutional because students had a “choice.”89  
Essentially, the A.N.A. court accepted the same “freedom of choice” 
argument that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected more than forty years 
ago in Green.90  Ostensibly, the students at Breckinridge had a choice 
of single-sex or coeducational classes, yet the court overlooked the 
coercive aspects of the single-sex program. The A.N.A. court provided 
no good answers to the plaintiffs’ complaints about the nuances of 
the choices they were offered or not offered: the initial random 
assignments into single-sex classes,91 the pressure of school officials,92 
 
began, and a letter was sent on the day that school began on August 23, 
2012.  For the 2011–12 school year, the record shows that forms were 
mailed out on or about August 18, 2011, while the school year was 
scheduled to begin approximately a week later. 
Id.  
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 780.  The court held that the ED “regulations require an affirmative 
assent by parents or guardians before placing children in single-sex classrooms.”  Id. 
at 776. 
 88  A.N.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 673 (W.D. Ky. 
2011). 
 89  Id. at 676 n.7.  
 90  See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 91  For one of the school years, 2007–08, the students were simply assigned to 
either a single-sex or coeducational classroom.  It took repeated parental objections 
for students to be switched out of single-sex classes and into coed classes, and those 
changes were only permitted after the semester had been underway for several 
weeks.  Brief for Plaintiffs at 7, A.N.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. 
Supp. 2d 673 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (No. 3:08-cv-00004-CRS), available at  
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Memorandum_of_Law_2.pdf.  Because those 
students “chose” not to opt out of the assigned classes after three weeks of school, the 
court thought that the principle of choice remained intact.  A.N.A., 833 F. Supp. 2d 
at 683.   
 92  The court completely ignored the fact that middle school administrators 
steered students toward the single-sex classes and made opting out extremely 
difficult.  The school sent letters to parents encouraging them to select the single-sex 
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the later trade-offs in class size,93 or the choices students were forced 
to make between single-sex classes and educational quality in 
coeducational classes.94 The court handled these sophisticated 
arguments—arguments that asked the court to drill down into the 
meaning of the choices the students were given—with the very 
simplistic and thrice-repeated answer that coeducational classes were 
available at Breckinridge County Middle School.95 
Even more disturbing, the A.N.A court misapplied the 
constitutional standard from United States v. Virginia.  The court 
interpreted the VMI holding as meaning only that “barring students 
from educational opportunities based on their sex without an 
exceedingly persuasive justification constitutes an invasion of a legally 
protected interest.”96  VMI was in fact a case of completely precluding 
an opportunity.  The A.N.A. court tried to examine the single-sex 
classes issue as a matter of educational preclusion.  In other words, 
the court framed the single-sex education issue as one of completely 
precluding girls from all-boys classes and completely precluding boys 
from all-girls classes.  It then reasoned that students were not barred 
from educational opportunities because they could choose 
 
option and the principal counseled parents to enroll their children in single-sex 
classes, touting the benefits and omitting any disadvantages.  Brief for Plaintiffs at 4, 
A.N.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 833 F. Supp. 2d 673 (W.D. Ky. 2011) (No. 
3:08-cv-00004-CRS), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets
/Memorandum_of_Law_2.pdf. 
 93  A.N.A., 833 F. Supp. 2d at 681 n.9.  Tucked away in a footnote is the clear 
differential in class size between single-sex and coed classes: “[T]he class sizes for 
eighth grade classes during the 2008-2009 school year ranged from 10–12 students in 
the all-boys classes, 24–28 students in the all-girls classes, and 20–31 students in the 
coeducational classes.”  Id.  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that this was 
a less satisfactory educational environment because the plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate that their grades had suffered.  Id. at 681.  The court concluded that 
“[e]quivalent educational opportunities do not mandate identical classroom 
experiences” and implicitly decided that the offerings were “substantially equivalent.”  
Id. at 681, 679. 
 94  Id. at 681.  For one of the plaintiffs, the timing of the only higher-level math 
class necessitated his enrollment in a single-sex science class—a forced choice.  He 
suffered bullying and teasing in this class and later requested reassignment back to a 
coeducational classroom.  The A.N.A. court seemed unwilling to recognize that 
choice should imply freedom from coercion.  See Minow, supra note 76, at 817. 
 95  A.N.A., 833 F. Supp. 2d at 679 (“All BCMS students could choose to 
participate in coeducational classes.”); id. (“Coeducational classes (and thus the 
opportunity to learn alongside students of both the same and opposite sex) were 
clearly available to all students at BCMS.”); id. at 681–82 (“BCMS afforded parents 
the option of selecting a single-sex or coeducational classroom environment for their 
children.”). 
 96  Id. at 678. 
LEVIT/COHEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:06 PM 
2014] STILL UNCONSTITUTIONAL 359 
 
coeducation.97  Choice, for the court, was the facile answer to any 
equal protection problem. 
This framing ignores the central constitutional question: If the 
state is creating opportunities for sex-segregated classrooms, is there 
an exceedingly persuasive justification supporting the segregated 
alternatives in the first place?  It is no answer to say that students are 
offered a choice of attending a class of questionable constitutionality 
or a coed class.  The mere existence of choice does not eliminate the 
constitutional problem—that there is public funding of sex 
segregation.  Think about it in the context of race.  What would 
people say if the state paid for an all-white class, an all-black class, and 
a racially mixed class?98  Nobody would have difficulty seeing that the 
constitutional justification must come first if the issue were 
transplanted into the race context.99  The A.N.A. court should have 
required the state to justify offering a segregative alternative in the 
first place, to substantiate with empirical evidence that single-sex 
education produced substantial academic and social benefits, and to 
demonstrate that those benefits outweighed any disadvantages caused 
by stereotyping from state-sponsored segregation.100 
A.N.A. is particularly appalling in its nonchalant dismissal of 
Brown v. Board of Education: “Unlike the separation of public school 
students by race, the separation of students by sex does not give rise 
to a finding of constitutional injury as a matter of law.”101  The court 
assumes that race is so different from sex that the messages sent by 
state-sponsored segregation do not apply.  This assumption flies in 
the face of contemporary understandings about what children learn 
when they are separated based on identity characteristics.102  Separate 
 
 97  Id. at 678–79. 
 98  This thought experiment has an obvious answer without even considering the 
complicating factor that race is a social construct and that, even accepting that 
construct, there are more than just white and black people.  The same issues arise in 
the context of single-sex education, though those issues are beyond the scope of this 
particular Article.  David S. Cohen, Sex Segregation, Masculinities, and Gender-Variant 
Individuals, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 167 
(Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., NYU Press 2012). 
 99  See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. 
 100  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 522–46 (1996) (conducting a 
searching inquiry into the claimed educational advantages of single-sex paramilitary 
education and balancing actual advantages against potential risks of fostering gender 
stereotypes). 
 101  A.N.A., 833 F. Supp. 2d at 678. 
 102  See infra notes 200–2093 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAM PETERS, A 
CLASS DIVIDED: THEN AND NOW (1971) (discussing the classic “blue eyes, brown eyes” 
study in which elementary school children are taught to create hierarchies and 
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but equal is inherently unequal.103 
The reasons why both inequality and coercion are likely to be 
repeated, even under opt-in systems, are illuminated by the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Vermilion Parish.104  In that case, the 
principal of Rost Middle School requested that the Vermilion Parish 
School Board permit him to “conduct an experiment for his doctoral 
dissertation” by assigning some eighth graders to single-sex classes 
during part of the 2008–2009 school year.105  At the end of this 
experiment, he showed the School Board data that seemed to 
indicate academic and behavioral advantages from the single-sex 
classes and requested Board approval for a much broader program of 
single-sex assignment during the 2009–2010 school year.  The Board, 
which heard only the principal’s inaccurate data106 and supportive 
statements from proponents of single-sex education, approved the 
request for expansion of single-sex classes to two all-girls classes, two 
all-boys classes, and one coeducational class. 
The initial assignment of students was mandatory, but the Board, 
after researching the ED regulations, later tried to make sure that 
enrollment in the single-sex classes was voluntary by sending out 
consent forms.  Principal David Dupuis followed up the mailing of 
these consent forms by calling only parents who had initially chosen 
coed classes and convincing more than thirty “families to move their 
children into single-sex classes.”107  There is also evidence that the 
principal approached individual children to talk them into switching 
 
ingroups and outgroups based on eye color); A Class Divided (Frontline television 
broadcast Mar. 26, 1985), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/shows/divided. 
 103  Even if it were theoretically possible to have absolute equality, the choices 
toward segregated education are being coerced, see supra notes 81–95 and 
accompanying text, and the teaching methods are demonstrably unequal.  See infra 
notes 200–209 and accompanying text. 
 104  Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App’x 366 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 105  Id. at 368. 
 106 
The district court said “it sure looks like he fudged a bunch of the 
numbers” in order to support his conclusion that single-sex education 
improved academic performance.  Doe’s expert analyzed the school’s 
grading records and testified that grades actually declined during the 
period of single-sex education.  Dupuis’s analysis of the behavioral data 
was also inaccurate.  He admitted in court that the introduction of a 
state-mandated “positive behavior support” system had improved 
student behavior, not single-sex education. 
Id. 
 107  Id. at 370 (“There is no evidence that he called a parent who initially chose 
single-sex to discuss the possibility of switching to coed.”). 
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into or staying in single-sex classes because the coeducational class 
was going to be a “special needs” class.108  The resulting composition 
of the remaining coed classes for the 2009–2010 year “were 73 
percent boys and 27 percent girls, when the population of the school 
was closer to 55 percent boys and 45 percent girls,” and these “coed 
classes were disproportionately filled with students with special needs 
and Individual Education Plans (‘IEPs’).”109  Thirty-seven out of the 
thirty-eight students at Rost Middle School who had IEPs for “more 
severe impairments” were assigned to the coeducational classes, while 
all of the students identified as “talented and gifted” were placed in 
single-sex classrooms.110 
The Vermilion Parish court recognized that one of the problems 
of choice is that coercion can occur at multiple levels: importuning 
school boards to make changes based on tilted, or factually 
inaccurate, presentations of evidence; steerage of parents and 
students; and assignments based on ability that sort higher-
performing students into single-sex classes and lower-performing or 
special needs students into the coed class.  The most basic 
interpretation of Vermilion Parish is that the court held that students 
suffer a constitutional injury if a school creates single-sex classes and 
the coeducational classes that remain are not substantially equivalent.  
The court certainly looked at whether a single-sex program hurt 
students who had not opted for the single-sex offering.  This is a 
problem that is likely to recur in any scenario—one parent’s choices 
will affect educational outcomes for other students. 
The skimming of students into single-sex classes is a concern 
portended by the American Association of University Women, whose 
Separated by Sex roundtable warned fifteen years ago that single-sex 
programs would “have effects on other classrooms . . . by siphoning 
off students from coed classes and skewing the sex ratio in those 
classes.”111  The Vermilion Parish experience attests to several types of 
skewing effects that can result: dramatically altering sex ratios for the 
students left behind, sorting students based on special needs, and 
 
 108  Declaration of Jane Doe, Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd. at ¶¶ 21–22 (Sept. 
8, 2009) (No. 09–1565), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/womensrights
/janedoevvermilionparish_ declaration.pdf. 
 109  Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App’x at 370. 
 110  Id. 
 111  AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, SEPARATED BY SEX: A CRITICAL LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX 
EDUCATION FOR GIRLS 9 (1998).  The American Association of University Women 
created a roundtable of gender researchers to evaluate two decades’ worth of single-
sex research regarding K-12 education.  Id. at 1.  
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siphoning off high performers.  The skimming problems dramatically 
undermine whatever liberty value exists in parental choice.112  With 
respect to the cascade effect that single-sex “choices” have on other 
students left behind, litigators would be wise to consider Dean 
Martha Minow’s argument that one avenue to constitutionally 
evaluate segregation should be under the liberty deprivation 
jurisprudence of the Due Process Clause rather than as an equal 
protection violation.  As Minow framed it, this inquiry would focus on 
the individuals affected by “the deprivation of the liberty to learn in a 
co-educational environment.”113 
The Vermilion Parish court delved further and also examined 
what was occurring within the single-sex classes.  The school 
intentionally used different pedagogical strategies to teach the boys’ 
classes—“action techniques”—and the girls’ classes—“a more quiet 
environment.”114  This is the problem of flawed brain research 
influencing the adoption of single-sex programs and then 
subsequently compelling sex-specific and dramatically different 
curricular and teaching strategies. 
Outside the particulars of individual situations, what is 
happening analytically in these cases involving choice arguments is 
not what ought to occur in equal protection analysis: schools should 
have the burden of demonstrating the exceedingly persuasive 
justification for segregation in the first place.  Beyond that, courts 
need to examine not only any perceived benefits of choice, but also 
disadvantages: the effects of differential teaching methods, whether 
segregation itself will damage the ability of children to deal with the 
opposite sex as comrades and colleagues, and the key question 
unresolved in Vermilion Parish of whether “both the co-ed and the 
same-sex classes are inferior to what would be available were this 
program not in place.”115 
Even if “choice” could inoculate sex segregation in principle, 
such choices are rarely equal in practice in ways that eliminate 
 
 112  JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS: ON LIBERTY 92–93 (Oxford University Press 
1975) (1859) (“As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the 
interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the 
general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to 
discussion.”). 
 113  Martha Minow, ‘‘A Proper Objective”: Constitutional Commitment and Educational 
Opportunity After Bolling v. Sharpe and Parents Involved in Community Schools, 55 
HOW. L.J. 575, 603 (2012). 
 114  Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App’x at 371. 
 115  Id. at 374. 
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coercion because of the push in the single-sex education community 
toward spurious brain research and consequent adoption of sex-
specific teaching methods.  We now turn to the topic of brain 
research and its effect on education policies. 
B. Brain Research 
A relatively new set of arguments is being used to support single-
sex education.  Some supporters draw on very dubious “brain 
research,” which purports to show that boys’ and girls’ brains are so 
different that they need separate classrooms and male- or female-
tailored curricula.116  Sex-segregation advocates like Leonard Sax and 
Michael Gurian say that “[t]he different regions [of boys’ and girls’ 
brains] develop in different sequence,”117 so boys have more energy, 
will be impulsive, and will not sit still, and that the different sexes 
need separate classrooms and different pedagogy to learn.118  But 
even if most academics agree that bad brain science evidence should 
be off the table, this research is prompting school boards, principals, 
 
 116  See, e.g., MICHAEL GURIAN ET AL., BOYS AND GIRLS LEARN DIFFERENTLY!: A GUIDE 
FOR TEACHERS AND PARENTS 13–70 (rev. ed. 2011); MICHAEL GURIAN ET AL., SUCCESSFUL 
SINGLE-SEX CLASSROOMS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TEACHING BOYS AND GIRLS SEPARATELY 
21–39 (2009); LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 11–38 (2005) 
(“[F]emale brain tissue is ‘intrinsically different’ from male brain tissue . . . .”); see 
also Elaine Ekpo, Is “Different But Equal” the New “Separate But Equal?” NCLB’s Single-Sex 
Schooling Option Signals New Horizons for Some While Challenging Equal Education 
Convictions for Others, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 315, 355 (2011) 
(“[A]dvocates frequently assert the oft-cited, overly broad declaration that ‘boys and 
girls learns [sic] differently.’”).  Other proponents of single-sex education, such as 
Rosemary Salomone, have been careful to distance their support for single-sex 
programs from those arguing about hard-wired sex differences.  Elizabeth Weil, 
Teaching Boys and Girls Separately, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 2, 2008, at 38, 41 (quoting 
Salomone as saying, “‘What kind of message does it give when you tell a group of kids 
that boys and girls need to be separated because they don’t even see or hear 
alike?  . . .  Every time I hear of school officials selling single-sex programs to parents 
based on brain research, my heart sinks.’”).  
 117  Single-Sex vs. Coed: The Evidence, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SINGLE SEX PUB. EDUC., 
http://web.archive.org/web/20130520091050/http://www.singlesexschools.org/res
earch-brain.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).  As one of us noted elsewhere, “[b]oth 
Sax and Gurian run organizations with the mission of taking the emerging science of 
sex differences and translating that to public policy reform in the form of increased 
sex-segregated education.”  David S. Cohen, The Stubborn Persistence of Sex Segregation, 
20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 51, 73 (2011); see also Peg Tyre, Boy Brains, Girl Brains: Are 
Separate Classrooms the Best Way to Teach Kids?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 59 
(“Gurian has trained more than 15,000 teachers through his institute in Colorado 
Springs.”). 
 118  MICHAEL GURIAN & KATHY STEVENS, THE MINDS OF BOYS: SAVING OUR SONS FROM 
FALLING BEHIND IN SCHOOL AND LIFE 46–52 (2005). 
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and teachers to get on the single-sex bandwagon.119  These arguments 
are being enthusiastically embraced by schools across the country, 
which are setting up “often highly gender-stereotypic learning 
environments,” with girls learning about fashion and boys throwing 
balls during math lessons.120  The description offered by the principal 
of a Kentucky elementary school illustrates the extent to which 
administrators are revamping the curriculum in light of these beliefs: 
Because males have less serotonin in their brains, which . . .  
may cause them to fidget more, desks were removed from 
the boys’ classrooms and they got short exercise periods 
throughout the day.  Because females have more oxytocin, a 
hormone linked to bonding, girls were given a carpeted 
area where they sit and discuss their feelings.  Because boys 
have higher levels of testosterone and are theoretically 
more competitive, they were given timed, multiple-choice 
tests.  The girls were given multiple-choice tests, too, but got 
more time to complete them.121 
Theorists in disciplines ranging from applied psychology to 
neuroscience have debunked these essentialist explanations for 
behavioral differences between the sexes,122 so we will limit this 
section to a brief recap of the flaws in the argument that biological 
 
 119  Nancy Chi Cantalupo points out that “people tend to believe scientific—
particularly neuroscientific—explanations that they would otherwise identify as 
specious and are therefore less likely to be skeptical of the accuracy of the sex-based 
brain differences research.”  Nancy Chi Cantalupo, Comparing Single-Sex and Reformed 
Coeducation: A Constitutional Analysis, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 725, 769 (2012). 
 120  Rebecca Bigler & Lise Eliot, The Feminist Case Against Single-Sex Schools, SLATE 
(Oct. 11, 2011),  http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2011/10
/the_single_sex_school_myth_an_overwhelming_body_of_research_show 
.html. 
 121  Tyre, supra note 117, at 59. 
 122  See, e.g., CORDELIA FINE, DELUSIONS OF GENDER: HOW OUR MINDS, SOCIETY, AND 
NEUROSEXISM CREATE DIFFERENCE 15–17, 112–17 (2010) (criticizing studies trying to 
show that gender differences have strong biological determinants, and 
demonstrating strong cultural influences on gender); Janet Shibley Hyde, The Gender 
Similarities Hypothesis, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 581, 581–90 (2005) (collecting data from 46 
meta-analyses (aggregated research findings from numerous studies) about gender 
differences and concluding that “[e]xtensive evidence” supports the gender 
similarities hypothesis “that males and females are alike on most—but not all—
psychological variables”); REBECCA M. JORDAN-YOUNG, BRAIN STORM: THE FLAWS IN THE 
SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 2 (2010) (detailing deep methodological flaws in the 
research purporting to support that “human brains are ‘hardwired’ for sex-typed 
preferences and skills by early hormone exposures”); see also Cantalupo, supra note 
119, at 767 (noting that “much of what has been presented as scientific research 
showing sex-based brain differences is not only problematic to begin with but also 
has gone through an additional process of distortion on its way to consumption by 
the general public”). 
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sex differences necessitate segregated educational approaches. Most 
reputable neuroscientists and child development experts consider 
the references to brain-based sex differences in support of single-sex 
education to be an exercise in “pseudoscience.”123 
While there are some subtle brain differences between boys and 
girls on average—slight differences in auditory processing or frontal 
lobe development—none “are substantial enough to justify different 
educational methods.”124  Neuroscientists have explained that the 
“brain differences” arguments used to support single-sex schools are 
a misuse of research in structural and functional neurobiology.125  
Lise Eliot, an Associate Professor of Neuroscience at the Chicago 
Medical School, says: “Ignoring the fundamental plasticity by which 
the brain learns anything, several popular authors . . . promot[e] the 
view that differences between the sexes are fixed, hard-wired, and 
predetermined biological facts.”126  She concludes that “overall, boys’ 
and girls’ brains are remarkably alike.”127 
Even where sex-based brain or hormonal differences do exist, 
these may not have any significance in terms of performance.128  
Performance differences between members of the same sex are much 
larger than behavioral differences between boys and girls.129  The 
conclusion that sex-differentiated behavior is primarily learned and 
not biologically hard-wired is robust and is supported not only by 
findings in neuroscience,130 but also by psychosocial studies of the 
family: 
[S]tudies of children with older, opposite-sex siblings have 
shown that the younger siblings have more balanced 
masculine and feminine traits, with corresponding benefits 
for their cognitive and emotional skills.  As the younger 
 
 123  See Diane F. Halpern et al., The Pseudoscience of Single-Sex Schooling, SCIENCE, 
Sept. 23, 2011, at 1706; see also Margaret Talbot, Sexed Ed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, 
at 17.  
 124  Halpern et al., supra note 123, at 1706. 
 125  LISE ELIOT, PINK BRAIN BLUE BRAIN: HOW SMALL DIFFERENCES CAN GROW INTO 
TROUBLESOME GAPS—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 9 (2009). 
 126  Id. at 9. 
 127  Id. at 5. 
 128  See Cohen, supra note 117, at 72 (citing COLIN HAMILTON, COGNITION AND SEX 
DIFFERENCES 181 (2008)) (“[I]nteresting individual [brain] differences can occur in 
the absence of performance differences.”). 
 129  ELIOT, supra note 125, at 11. 
 130  Id. at 6–7 (“[T]he male-female differences that have the most impact—
cognitive skills, such as speaking, reading, math, and mechanical ability; and 
interpersonal skills, such as aggression, empathy, risk taking, and competitiveness—
are heavily shaped by learning.”). 
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siblings seek to imitate their older, opposite-sex siblings, the 
younger siblings tend to develop interests and activities in 
less gender-stereotypic ways, and their abilities become 
more well-rounded.131 
There is no good research to support the efficacy of sex-
differentiated teaching strategies.  While it is difficult to prove the 
null hypothesis, the most recent research from the best theorists in 
the area of gender differences and cognition indicates that the 
underlying neurobiology of learning is the same for boys and girls.132  
Cognitive sex differences—average or group differences in scores—
exist on some measures, but these do not imply that girls have 
“different learning styles” from boys.  For example, boys and girls 
both benefit from visual displays of spatial information and from 
verbal lessons with verbal materials.133  There is no evidence that girls 
benefit more from cooperative learning environments and boys from 
competitive ones.  Indeed, the learning-styles hypothesis has come 
under sharp criticism.134 
In addition, cross-cultural studies of sex differences in reading, 
mathematics, and science literacy demonstrate that those differences 
are more or less marked in different cultures, indicating a strong role 
for socio-cultural influences on gendered behaviors.135  One recent 
examination of test results from sixty-five nations participating in the 
Programme for International Student Assessment concluded that 
“cross-culturally . . . evidence for the gender similarities hypothesis is 
stronger.”136 
 
 
 131  Cantalupo, supra note 119, at 769. 
 132  See, e.g., Report of Diane F. Halpern, A.N.A. v. Breckinridge Cnty. Bd. of Educ. 
(W.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2009) (No. 3:08-cv-00004), Exhibit 3, p. 8 (reviewing 
comprehensively the largest and best-controlled national and international studies, 
and concluding that “[t]he data do not support the idea that girls and boys differ in 
how they learn”).   
 133  Harold Pashler et al., Learning Styles: Concepts and Evidence, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. 
INTEREST 105, 116 (Dec. 2008).   
 134  Id. at 117 (“The contrast between the enormous popularity of the learning-
styles approach within education and the lack of credible evidence for its utility is, in 
our opinion, striking and disturbing.”). 
 135  See David I. Miller & Diane F. Halpern, The New Science of Cognitive Sex 
Differences, 18 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37, 37 (Nov. 2013) (finding that “[c]ognitive 
sex differences are changing, decreasing for some tasks while remaining stable or 
increasing for other tasks” and noting the early “effects of family and culture” on 
what initially were thought to be biological sex differences). 
 136  David Reilly, Gender, Culture, and Sex-Typed Cognitive Abilities, 7 PUB. LIB. SCI. 1, 
15 (July 2012). 
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The plasticity idea is important in terms of how gendered 
behaviors are learned.  We return in Part III.D. of this Article to the 
role of sex segregation itself in the formation of gendered behaviors 
and attitudes.137  We first examine recent studies evaluating the 
operation of single-sex schools and classes. 
C. Educational Outcomes 
1. Earlier Conclusions—When Conflating Variables Are 
Controlled, Differences Disappear 
In 1999, one of us reviewed studies and meta-analyses of studies 
of single-sex education at elementary, secondary, and college levels 
and found “no significant differences between the impact of 
coeducational and of single-sex schools on student performance and 
achievement.”138 Numerous studies, over time, demonstrated that 
when studies control for conflating variables—such as pre-existing 
student background characteristics (intelligence, educational 
attainment, class, attitudes, and performance predictors), small class 
sizes, a focus on core academic subjects, parental involvement, school 
selectivity, qualified and engaged teachers who use individually 
tailored strategies and offer feedback, and economic resources—the 
effects of single-sex environments are insignificant.139 
 
 137  See infra notes 203–213 and accompanying text; see also Boys’ Brains vs. Girls’ 
Brains: What Sex Segregation Teaches Students, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 19, 
2008), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/boys-brains-vs-girls-brains-what-sex-
segregation-teaches-students-0.  
[T]eachers around the country are being encouraged to treat girls and 
boys differently, based on overgeneralizations about the differences 
between boys and girls. The proponents of these theories use lots of 
language about brain structures and hormones that sounds scientific, 
but in the end, they are simply arguing that the old stereotypes about 
what boys are good at and what girls are good at are accurate . . . .  Sex 
segregation based on theories of gender differences is the wrong 
approach because it encourages educators to oversimplify the issue of 
learning style differences, and to ignore the more nuanced needs of 
both girls and boys. The better solution is to give all teachers the 
training and resources to reach students with a variety of learning 
styles, regardless of students’ gender, and to discourage teachers from 
relying on imprecise stereotypes about how boys and girls learn. 
Id. 
 138  Levit, supra note 61, at 489; see also Valerie E. Lee, Is Single-Sex Secondary 
Schooling a Solution to the Problem of Gender Inequity, in SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 
111, at 41, 43 (offering a meta-analysis of research on private schools and finding 
that it demonstrates “no consistent pattern of effects for attending either single-sex 
or coeducational independent schools for either boys or girls”). 
 139  See, e.g., Herbert W. Marsh, Effects of Attending Single-Sex and Coeducational High 
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One of the larger patterns that emerges from a review of 
the research over the past several decades is that studies in 
the late 1970s and the early 1980s showing educational 
achievement and attitude effects favoring single-sex schools 
and classes are being revised and disputed by more 
sophisticated studies in the late 1990s that include better 
controls for confounding variables.  Earlier studies, those 
conducted in the 1970s and the 1980s, are more likely to 
find correlations between a single-sex environment for girls 
and positive achievement results.  Later studies, from the 
mid 1980s to the present, and those with more sophisticated 
methodology (controlling for conflating variables), are 
more likely to find that the effects of institutional gender 
type are insignificant and to show that other variables, such 
as prior individual student factors or institutional selectivity 
factors, matter much more to student satisfaction and 
performance.  These later studies are more likely to favor 
mixed-sex over single-sex education.140 
When appropriate controls are instituted, differences between 
schools or classes based on sex literally “disappear.”141 
Older reports did find some slight attitudinal advantages for 
females at the secondary level.  Some girls liked being in an all-girl 
environment and thought this placement gave them more 
confidence.142  These correlations were attested to mostly by 
 
Schools on Achievement, Attitudes, Behaviors, and Sex Differences, 81 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 70, 
71 (1989); Judith L. Stoecker & Ernest T. Pascarella, Women’s Colleges and Women’s 
Career Attainments Revisited, 62 J. HIGHER EDUC. 394, 395 (1991); see also Sara 
Mandelbaum, Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy Issues Raised by All-Female Public 
Education, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 81, 83–85 (1997).   
 140  Levit, supra note 61, at 500–01. 
 141  See Richard Harker & Roy Nash, School Type and the Education of Girls: Co-ed or 
Girls Only?, 2, 17 (Mar. 1997), http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED410633.pdf (paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research 
Association). 
 142   Gilah C. Leder & Helen J. Forgasz, Single-Sex Mathematics Classes in a Co-
educational Setting: A Case Study, 2, 22 (1994), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED372946.pdf (paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the American Educational Research Association) (reporting on a high 
school in Melbourne, Australia that experimented with single-sex math classes for all 
tenth graders).  Although both the boys and the girls thought that they had 
benefitted from single-sex classes, test results showed that “performance levels for 
males and females were not significantly different throughout the project year.”  Id. 
at 23; see also Ursula Kessels & Bettina Hannover, When Being a Girl Matters Less: 
Accessibility of Gender-related Self-knowledge in Single-sex and Coeducational Classes and Its 
Impact on Students’ Physics-related Self-concept of Ability, 78 BRIT. J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 273, 
274 (2008) (reviewing the mixed literature on whether single-sex schooling 
promoted a positive self-concept in girls); Lucian K. Tambo et al., Influence of Type of 
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anecdotal stories,143 but did not translate into academic attainments.144  
One study found that girls, but not boys, in single-sex Catholic 
schools expressed higher educational aspirations than those in 
coeducational schools, and those researchers cautioned that their 
study could not control for the confounding effect of the religious 
environment and did not control for parental involvement (choosing 
single-sex schools because of purported quality benefits).145 The 
database for that study also failed to control for “preexisting 
differences in academic achievement, prior course work, self-concept, 
locus of control or other school-related behaviors and attitudes that 
were considered as outcomes.”146  Ultimately, one of the original 
researchers, Valerie Lee, concluded after many years of research on 
single-sex education that “separating adolescents by gender for 
secondary schooling is not an appropriate solution to the problem of 
gender inequity in educational outcomes, either in the short or the 
long run.”147 
This conclusion was echoed by the American Association of 
University Women, which convened a national roundtable of 
prominent researchers in psychology and education to evaluate two 
decades’ worth of single-sex research regarding K–12 education.  The 
researchers determined, “[t]here is no evidence that single-sex 
 
School on Self-Perception of Mathematical Ability and Achievement Among Girls in Secondary 
Schools in Harare, 9 GENDER & BEHAV. 3897 (2011) (finding that among 90 students at 
one all-girls school in Zimbabwe, the girls’ self-perception of their math abilities was 
higher than that of girls in coeducational schools, but finding no performance 
differences). 
 143  See, e.g., ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-
SEX SCHOOLING 35 (2003) (describing three all-girls schools as “safe harbors where 
girls can securely weather the storms of adolescence while nurturing their spirit and 
intellect”). 
 144  See, e.g., Paul C. LePore & John Robert Warren, A Comparison of Single-Sex and 
Coeducational Catholic Secondary Schooling: Evidence from the National Educational 
Longitudinal Study of 1988, 34 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 485 (1997); see also Kenneth J. Rowe, 
Single-Sex and Mixed-Sex Classes: The Effects of Class Type on Student Achievement, 
Confidence and Participation in Mathematics, 32 AUSTL. J. EDUC. 180, 195–96 (1988) 
(finding initially that students in single-sex mathematics classes demonstrated greater 
confidence, but noting that “higher achievers had initially been allocated, albeit 
inadvertently, to single-sex classes”); SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 111, at 22 
(concluding, after reviewing twenty years’ worth of studies, that single-sex classes do 
not improve girls’ academic achievements). 
 145  Valerie E. Lee & Anthony S. Bryk, Effects of Single-Sex Secondary Schools on Student 
Achievement and Attitudes, 78 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 381, 382, 391 (1986). 
 146  Marsh, supra note 139, at 72.   
 147  Lee, supra note 138138, at 46. 
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education in general ‘works’ or is ‘better’ than coeducation.”148  
There was also a dark side to these attitudinal studies: numerous 
researchers found that single-sex education reinforced gender 
stereotypes and fostered traditional and sexist attitudes.149  We discuss 
this problem in much more depth in Part III.D below. 
2.  Recent Research Is Inconclusive at Best, With Controlled 
Studies Showing No Benefits 
In the past decade, the empirical literature in the sociology of 
education has confirmed these earlier conclusions.  Again, the same 
pattern has played out: studies with appropriate methodological 
controls on potentially conflating variables show that school sex type, 
whether a school is a boys’ school, a girls’ school, or a coeducational 
school, has minimal effect on academic outcome, and that other 
variables matter much more. 
In 2005, the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) 
commissioned a review by the American Institutes for Research (AIR) 
of the studies about single-sex education.150  Of the 2,221 quantitative 
studies examined, the NCES review found only forty to be 
methodologically adequate.  Studies were eliminated from 
consideration based on a variety of factors, including absent or weak 
methodological controls and studies conducted in a non-Westernized 
country or reported in a foreign language.  Also omitted from the 
review were any studies regarding single-sex classes within otherwise 
coeducational schools.  The researchers noted at the outset that 
almost all of the forty remaining studies would have been eliminated 
from consideration if the researchers had followed What Works 
Clearinghouse guidelines of randomized controlled trials, so the AIR 
 
 148   SEPARATED BY SEX, supra note 111, at 2. 
 149  See, e.g., AMANDA DATNOW ET AL., IS SINGLE GENDER SCHOOLING VIABLE IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR?: LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA’S PILOT PROGRAM, 2, 7 (2001), 
http://files.eric.ed.gov.ezproxy.shu.edu/fulltext/ED471051.pdf; Carolyn Jackson, 
Can Single-Sex Classes in Co-Educational Schools Enhance the Learning Experiences of Girls 
and/or Boys? An Exploration of Pupils’ Perceptions, 28 BRIT. EDUC. RES. J. 37, 44–46 
(2002); Valerie E. Lee et al., Sexism in Single-Sex and Coeducational Independent 
Secondary School Classrooms, 67 SOC. EDUC. 92, 99–100 (1994). 
 150  AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, SINGLE-SEX VERSUS COEDUCATIONAL 
SCHOOLING: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW, 2005, available at 
http://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other/single-sex/index.html; U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION, EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS: PERCEPTIONS 
AND CHARACTERISTICS (2008), available at http://ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other 
/single-sex/characteristics/index.html (relying on the statistical data contained in 
the AIR report). 
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researchers consciously “relax[ed] these standards and include[d] all 
correlational studies that employed statistical controls.”151 
This review of studies shows extremely mixed results.  For 
concurrent academic accomplishment, more than half (53%) of the 
studies showed no differences between single-sex and coeducation, 
while 35% reported some findings that favored single-sex schools, 2% 
favored coeducational schools, and 10% had findings going in both 
directions.152  In other words, more than half (53%) of the 
concurrent academic outcomes from the systematic review were null 
(showing no differences), and cumulatively, almost two-thirds of the 
results (the 53% plus the 2% favoring coeducation plus the 10% 
mixed results, or 65% total) did not support single-sex education.  With 
respect to socio-emotional outcomes, less than half (45%) favored 
single-sex schooling, while the majority of outcomes, cumulatively 
(54%), showed no differences (39%), the superiority of coeducation 
(10%), or mixed results (6%).153  Yet, the ED interpretation was that 
the AIR review “lends some empirical support to the hypothesis that 
single-sex schools may be helpful in terms of academic achievement 
and socio-emotional development.”154 
With respect to long-term academic accomplishment, the AIR 
found that the null set was even larger: 75% of the studies resulted in 
no differences in “postsecondary test scores, college graduation rates, 
or graduate school attendance rates.”155  Only two studies gave 
measurable data regarding subjective satisfaction with the school 
environment, one of which favored coeducation and the other of 
which favored single-sex education. Of the four studies addressing 
school culture (matters such as learning climate and opportunities 
for leadership roles), two of the studies gave some support to single-
sex environments, while two others showed no differences.156  A 
number of studies touched on socio-emotional development: 
“Regarding self-concept and locus of control, the studies are split 
between those showing positive effects for [single-sex] schooling and 
those showing no differences.  In the case of self-esteem, a third of 
the studies supported [coeducational] schooling while half found no 
 
 151  AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, supra note 150, at xi. 
 152  Id. at xii, xv.   
 153  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, supra note 150, at ix–x. 
 154  Id. at xv. 
 155  AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, supra note 150, at xv. 
 156  Id. at iv. 
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difference.”157 
The AIR authors warned that generalizations from the 
accumulated long-term adaptation and socio-emotional development 
studies should be viewed with caution, because the outcomes on 
different indicators appeared only in one or two studies.158  So, for 
example, one of two studies about sex-role stereotyping favored 
coeducational schools, while the other favored single-sex schools.159  
In the assessment of eating disorders, the researchers found that 
more students in a single-sex environment developed eating 
disorders than in a coeducational environment, but this is based on 
only one study.160  In the cumulative grouping of ten studies in this 
category—on matters ranging from postsecondary unemployment to 
political involvement to percent married to first spouse—five of the 
studies (50%) favored single-sex schooling, two (20%) favored 
coeducation, and three (30%) found no significant differences.161  
The researchers concluded, despite their own cautions, that these 
several studies “still suggest the potential that [single-sex] schooling 
could be associated with a number of post-high school, long-term 
positive outcomes.”162 
While the researchers insisted that the studies on which they 
reported did control for individual differences such as student ability, 
they acknowledged that “many studies that included at least one 
covariate lacked other important covariates such as ethnic[]or racial 
minority status, socioeconomic status, and grade level or age.”163  A 
significant difficulty with the AIR report is that its results are based on 
studies that simply could not control for some all-important variables, 
such as race or even “the effects of religious values.”164  Finally, the 
AIR researchers ended on an appropriately cautionary note by 
recognizing that if studies are conducted or observations made about 
 
 157  Id. at xv.  There are some troubling later studies showing self-perception of 
improvements in ability, but no achievement outcomes.  See, e.g., Tambo et al., supra 
note 142. 
 158  AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, supra note 150, at xvi. 
 159  Id. at xiv. 
 160  Id. at xvi. 
 161  Id. at xiv. 
 162  Id. at xvi. 
 163  Id. at xi. 
 164  AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH, supra note 150, at xi.  The researchers 
noted the importance of trying to control for these variables, yet cited to a number of 
studies conducted at Catholic schools.  See id. at 93 (citing, for example, Cornelius 
Riordan, Public and Catholic Schooling: The Effects of Gender Context Policy, 93 AM. J. 
EDUC. 518 (1985)). 
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a relatively new single-sex program, that any conclusions drawn need 
to take into account “the possibility of a Hawthorne effect, which can 
be manifested by an increase in student performance produced by 
the psychological stimulus of being singled out and made to feel 
important.”165 
This idea of a Hawthorne effect seems borne out by a number of 
the individual, smaller studies published since the AIR report.166  
Moreover, it is becoming increasingly impossible to disentangle 
assessment of outcomes from single-sex environments from the 
resources pumped into them: 
Of course, there are some terrific single-sex schools out 
there.  However, research finds that their success is not 
explained by gender composition, but by the characteristics 
of the entering students (such as economic background), 
by selection effects (for example, low performing students 
are not admitted, or are asked to leave), and by the 
substantial extra resources and mentoring these programs 
provide.167 
Other studies deal with very small samples and no controls,168 
demonstrate that reported successes may not be borne out on careful 
examination,169 and indicate abandonment of experiments without 
 
 165  Id. at 88. The Hawthorne effect is the effect of the observer on the observed. 
 166  See, e.g., Jennifer Shapka, Trajectories of Math Achievement and Perceived Math 
Competence over High School and Postsecondary Education: Effects of an All-Girl Curriculum 
in High School, 15 EDUC. RES. & EVALUATION 527, 537, 538 (2009) (reporting on 
twenty-six girls who had qualified for a single-sex ninth grade math class by being 
high achievers and following them for five years, and finding that while their 
performance “trajectory started high (when they were involved in the all-girl 
classes),” by the time they were in post-secondary classes, “all groups were achieving 
at a similar level” and concluding that “the elevated achievement experienced by 
girls in the intervention program during high school did not appear to have any 
impact on later perceived math competence”); Frances Spielhagen, “It All 
Depends  . . .”: Middle School Teachers Evaluate Single-Sex Classes, 34 RES. MIDDLE LEVEL 
EDUC. ONLINE 1, 1  (2011) (“By the end of the school year, the initially optimistic 
attitudes of the teachers toward the behavior of their students in the single-sex classes 
had diminished”). 
 167  Bigler & Eliot, supra note 120.  
 168  See, e.g., Max McFarland et al., Comparing Achievement Scores of Students in Gender 
Specific Classrooms with Students in Traditional Classrooms, 8 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 99, 111 
(2011) (reporting mixed results from creating subgroups of forty-eight fifth grade 
students from a Midwestern elementary school, where there was a boys only group of 
eight students, a girls only group of eight students, and a coed group of thirty-two 
students; despite the very small class size, “the gender specific classrooms did not 
improve boys MAPS reading scores as was the goal,” although “there is suggestion 
that gender specific classrooms help females”). 
 169  See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudence of Choice and 
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adequate record keeping.170 
One of the most comprehensive and recent meta-analyses 
provides support for the null hypothesis: that there are simply no 
educational or attitudinal benefits from single-sex schooling. In one 
of the largest studies to date, Erin Pahlke, Janet Shibley Hyde, and 
Carlie M. Allison conducted a meta-analysis of 184 separate studies, 
encompassing 1.6 million elementary through high school students 
from twenty-one countries.171  This new study addresses the quality of 
the prior studies comparing single-sex and coeducational schooling 
 
Diversity in Race and Sex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 455, 483–84 (The 
Young Women’s Leadership School in New York (TYWLS): 
[R]eported high standardized test scores compared to citywide 
averages and proclaimed that 100% of the thirty-two seniors in its first 
graduating class were accepted at four-year colleges.  The numbers are 
just tabulations, with no controls for other influential variables.  In fact, 
the numbers themselves are rarely analyzed.  The entering class that 
graduated in 2001 actually had fifty students in it.  Thus, it seems that 
eighteen of the original group were lost, which is a thirty-six percent 
attrition rate—roughly comparable to the attrition or transfer rate of 
other city schools.  This is the sort of information that is hard to ferret 
out; it is certainly not featured in news stories lauding the successes of 
the single-sex program at TYWLS. 
Id. 
 170  See, e.g., Emily Richmond, In Single-sex Experiment, School Failed to Measure, LAS 
VEGAS SUN, Oct. 29, 2009, at 1 (following a six-year experiment with single-sex 
seventh grade reading classes, “[t]he Clark County School District apparently did not 
try to assess, measure, or otherwise examine the effects of separating the sexes . . . .  
Or at the very least, district officials have been unable to locate any documentation of 
the initiative’s progress.”); see also Susan Frietsche & Sara Rose, Beyond Sugar and 
Spice: Real School Reform Doesn’t Rest on Gender Stereotypes, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 
2011, at B7.  
Pittsburgh Public Schools ended its ill-advised experiment with gender 
segregation at Westinghouse Academy, a grade 6–12 school in 
Homewood. 
. . .   
The ideological underpinnings of the plan were revealed to be little 
more than 1950s-era gender stereotypes in modern dress.  One 
document about the program produced by the school district referred 
to “male-hood and female-hood defined space,” intended to nurture 
characteristics of “warrior, protector and provider” for boys and 
“space/time to explore things that young women like [including] 
writing, applying and doing make-up & hair, art.” 
Id.; Jaclyn Zubrzycki, Single-Gender Schools Scrutinized: Caribbean Study May Offer Insights 
for United States, 31 EDUC. WK. 1, 13 (Jan. 18, 2012) (“The number of single-sex 
schools in South Carolina has declined after a peak two years ago . . . dropping from 
232 to 129 last fall.”). 
 171  Erin Pahlke, Janet Shibley Hyde, & Carlie M. Allison, The Effects of Single-Sex 
Compared With Coeducational Schooling on Students’ Performance and Attitudes: A Meta-
Analysis, 140 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1 (2014). 
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across a wide array of performance and attitudinal outcomes, and 
categorizes the studies as either controlled (including random 
assignment or controls for selection effects) or uncontrolled (lacking 
these characteristics).  In distinguishing these studies 
methodologically, the authors note that the studies cited by 
proponents of single-sex education as yielding advantages for single-
sex schooling are the “studies with inadequate methods, when 
selection effects are not controlled.”172 With respect to the high-
quality, controlled studies (covering more than 560,000 students), 
the researchers concluded that “[single-sex] schooling generally 
produced only trivial advantages over [coeducation], with most 
weighted effect sizes smaller than 0.10 (U.S. and international 
combined). There is little evidence of an advantage of single-sex 
schooling for girls or boys for any of the outcomes.”173 
3. International Evidence 
Cross-country research may be of limited applicability because of 
wide demographic, economic, and cultural variations between the 
United States and other countries.174  Several recent international 
studies have drawn attention in the debate about single-sex schools, 
however.  This section will focus on two recent sets of studies 
conducted in countries that have public single-sex schools—one set 
encompasses several different researchers evaluating schools from 
South Korea and the other is a study of schools in Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
South Korea has a national policy of close to randomly assigning 
middle and high school students into coeducational or single-sex 
schools, so it has drawn the attention of researchers.  Sociologist 
Hyunjoon Park and colleagues found, with qualification, that in 
Seoul, South Korea, attendance at an all-boys or all-girls school, 
rather than attendance at a coeducational high school, was associated 
with higher college entrance exam scores and greater likelihood of 
attending a four-year college.175  Yet, an important caveat to this 
 
 172  Id. at 24. 
 173  Id. at 23. 
 174  Hyunjoon Park et al., Causal Effects of Single-Sex Schools on College Entrance Exams 
and College Attendance: Random Assignment in Seoul High Schools 4 (Population Studies 
Ctr., Working Paper Series, 2012) (“Korea has the largest earnings gender gap 
(favoring men) among all OECD countries that provided the data . . . .  Underlying 
the limited economic opportunities of Korean women is a pervasive patriarchal 
culture.”). 
 175  Id. 
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research is that the quality of the single-sex schools may differ 
markedly from the coeducational schools, because “[s]ingle-sex 
schools in Seoul are predominantly private: about 80 percent of all-
boys and all-girls schools, respectively, are private, and only 30 
percent of coeducational schools are private.”176  Once the 
researchers controlled for this dimension, as well as the average years 
of teacher experience and schooling, teacher-student ratios, and 
percentage of students receiving lunch support (the only marker of 
socioeconomic status considered), the numbers dropped 
significantly.  For instance, “the estimated effect of all-girls schools on 
four-year college attendance rates . . . is still significant at the 90 
percent level with a magnitude that corresponds to 23 percent of one 
standard deviation.”177 
These researchers did not offer any ideas as to why there might 
be single-sex effect.  Moreover, their methodology could not account 
for a number of factors that other studies have found to completely 
confound what might be perceived as gender composition effects,178 
such as the socio-economic conditions of students: “The school-level 
data used in this study do not have detailed information on 
socioeconomic background of students attending the schools.”179  The 
private and public schools have markedly different systems of teacher 
selection and appointment, and the “all-boys schools in Seoul have a 
much larger proportion of male teachers than coeducational 
schools.”180 
Another set of sociologists, Doo Hwan Kim and Helen Law, 
examined the performance of 9,821 fifteen year olds from Korea and 
Hong Kong.181  Although the data initially indicated more favorable 
performance for both boys and girls at single-sex schools than at 
coeducation schools, once the researchers controlled for a host of 
school-level variables (such as class size, student-teacher ratio, 
academic selectivity of the schools, parents’ educational level, and 
 
 176  Id. at 9.  
 177  Id. at 21.  
 178  See, e.g., Mary J. Oates & Susan Williamson, Women’s Colleges and Women 
Achievers, 3 SIGNS 795, 799–800 (1978) (finding that controlling for institutional 
selectivity and socioeconomic advantages made any seeming differences formerly 
attributable to single-sex schools disappear). 
 179  Park et al., supra note 174, at 13. 
 180  Id. at 24.  
 181  Doo Hwan Kim & Helen Law, Gender Gap in Maths Test Scores in South Korea and 
Hong Kong: Role of Family-Background and Single-Sex Schooling, 32 INT’L J. EDUC. DEVEL. 
92 (2012). 
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parents’ perceptions of the quality of education), “girls attending a 
single-sex school scored, on average, 17.2 fewer points than those 
attending a co-ed school.  The positive advantage for boys of 
attending a single-sex school rather than co-ed school remained 
statistically significant.”182 
Educational psychologist Erin Pahlke and colleagues decided to 
focus on middle schools in South Korea, because “random 
assignment appears to have been practiced less carefully at the high-
school level than at the middle-school level.”183  The data set they used 
encompassed almost 10,000 eighth graders at 150 schools.  
Importantly, these researchers used hierarchical linear modeling to 
“account for the nested nature of the data . . . .  Students within the 
same school tend to be similar in many respects that are unrelated to 
the sex composition of the classroom (e.g., family resources, teacher 
qualifications).”184  What they found was that performance differences 
for both boys and girls on mathematics and science achievement tests 
were not related to whether they attended single-sex schools, but 
instead were a function of resources at the family and school levels.  
They concluded, “gender composition of the school was not a 
significant predictor in any of the models; in other words, girls’ and 
boys’ performance in all content and cognitive mathematics and 
science domains did not significantly differ as a function of their 
attending a coeducational or single-sex school.” 185 
The conclusions of Pahlke and her colleagues about Korea are 
reinforced by research a continent away in South America.  One of 
 
 182  Id. at 96. 
 183  Erin Pahlke, The Effects of Single-Sex Compared with Coeducational Schooling on 
Mathematics and Science Achievement: Data from Korea, 105 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 444, 446 
(2013). 
 184  Id. 
 185  Id. at 449.  Rather, other factors predicted performance: 
Instead, for both the 2007 and the 2003 data sets, students’ 
performance was consistently significantly predicted by factors related 
to socioeconomic status; students (both boys and girls) performed 
better on the mathematics and science exams when their fathers had 
more education, their families had more resources, and a lower 
proportion of their schoolmates came from economically 
disadvantaged families . . . .  Other factors (i.e., teachers’ experience, 
instructional time, the size of communities and schools, and students’ 
mother’s education) were predictive of achievement in some domains 
for either boys or girls. However, these models emphasize that it is not 
the gender composition of the schools that determines mathematics 
and science performance, but rather family and school resources. 
Id. 
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the most important and very recent studies emphasizes the need for 
extreme caution in the rush toward single-sex education.  Professor 
Kirabo Jackson, a labor economist and faculty fellow at Northwestern 
University’s Institute for Policy Research, conducted quasi-
experimental research about single-sex and coeducational schools in 
Trinidad and Tobago.186  The unique features of the school system 
there are that the vast majority of the 123 secondary schools are 
public, and about one-fourth of them are single-sex.  The Ministry of 
Education assigns students to either single-sex or coed schools based 
on their secondary school entrance exam scores and their 
preferences.  Jackson was able to obtain enough information to offer 
a metric about the strength of individual students’ preferences for 
single-sex as opposed to coeducation.187 
Jackson’s conclusions are that for more than 85% of all students, 
there is no academic benefit to single-sex schools.188  The only 
demonstrable positive effects for single-sex schools were for the 14% 
of students (girls) who had a strong preference for a single-sex 
environment.189  Even then, he cautioned that “single-sex schools are 
more selective than coed schools and they attract higher quality 
teachers . . . .  [Thus,] the effects presented likely over-state the pure 
single-sex schooling effect.”190  Boys did not benefit from attendance 
at single-sex schools.191  He concluded, “The results suggest that 
single-sex schooling per se is not associated with better outcomes on 
average . . . . [A]ttending a single-sex school provides no benefit over 
attending an equally selective coed school on average.”192 
One other intriguing finding was that attendance at single-sex 
secondary school did not promote interest among girls in math, 
science, or engineering, as previous researchers have claimed: 
“Contrary to common belief, girls took fewer science courses and more 
traditionally female subjects at single-sex schools.”193 
In short, the findings from several of the largest and most recent 
international studies echo the converging evidence of studies 
 
 186  C. Kirabo Jackson, Single-sex Schools, Student Achievement, and Course Selection: 
Evidence from Rule-based Student Assignments in Trinidad and Tobago, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 
173 (2012). 
 187  Id. at 177. 
 188  Id. at 185. 
 189  Id. at 174. 
 190  Id.  
 191  Id. at 186. 
 192  Jackson, supra note 186, at 184. 
 193  Id. at 174. 
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conducted in the United States—that the results showing 
performance differences between single-sex and coeducational 
schools are most likely attributable to factors other than the sex 
composition of the schools. 
D. Anti-stereotyping 
Another common argument proponents of single-sex education 
make is that single-sex education does not further gender stereotypes 
but rather that it works against them.  Leonard Sax has explained: 
“Here’s the paradox: coed schools tend to reinforce gender 
stereotypes, whereas single-sex schools can break down gender 
stereotypes.”194  The website for Sax’s National Association for Single-
Sex Public Education explains this further: 
Girls in single-sex educational settings are more likely to 
take classes in math, science, and information technology, 
especially when teachers have received appropriate 
training. Boys in single-gender classrooms—led (once 
again) by teachers with training in how to lead such 
classrooms—are much more likely to pursue interests in art, 
music, drama, and foreign languages.  Both girls and boys 
have more freedom to explore their own interests and 
abilities than in the coed classroom.195 
In fact, this argument is so important to the movement for 
single-sex education that the website’s homepage features three 
pictures with captions, each with a statement about breaking down 
stereotypes.  One picture shows a girl sitting on a basketball with the 
caption: “Girls who attend single-sex schools are more likely to 
participate in competitive sports than are girls at coed schools.”196  
The next picture shows two boys studying together.  Underneath is 
written, “Single-sex schools break down gender stereotypes.  It’s cool 
to study.”197  The final picture shows two girls sitting at a computer.  
The caption reads, “Single-sex schools break down gender 
stereotypes.  Girls at single-sex schools are more likely to study 
computer science and technology than are girls at coed schools.”198 
This argument has some intuitive appeal.  After all, we know that 
much of the employment market and higher education majors 
 
 194  SAX, supra note 116, at 243 (emphasis added). 
 195  NAT’L ASS’N FOR SINGLE SEX PUB. EDUC., http://www.singlesexschools.org/ 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2014). 
 196  Id. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. 
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remain highly segregated199 and that coeducation has been the norm 
for a long time in this country.  If we want to fight this segregation of 
interests and professions, the argument goes, maybe changing to sex 
segregation and focusing on diversifying within the segregated group 
would work.  There are, however, at least two problems with this 
argument that must be addressed before we even consider the 
pernicious ways in which sex segregation exacerbates stereotypes 
(which the next section explores). 
First, as a logical matter, the argument that single-sex education 
breaks down stereotypes actually relies on embedded stereotypes 
itself.  The reason proponents of single-sex education think 
separating boys and girls will have positive results is twofold: one, they 
believe that boys and girls need to be taught differently to bring out 
their true interests; and two, they believe that boys and girls distract 
each other when they are in classrooms together.  Both of these 
reasons rely on untrue assumptions about how all boys and all girls 
act.  The different classroom strategies rely on flawed science about 
boys’ and girls’ physiology as well as generalized notions of how and 
what boys and girls want to learn.200  The idea of distraction is based 
on presumed heterosexuality, another stereotype about boys and 
girls.201  Those children who clearly do not fit within these stereotypes 
cannot take advantage of this education reform, and those children 
who are not yet sure of exactly who they are in the world (most 
children) are given a clear message of how boys and girls are 
supposed to behave.  This has distinct harms that are detailed in the 
next section. 
 
 199  See, e.g., Ariane Hegewisch et al., Separate and Not Equal? Gender Segregation in 
the Labor Market and the Gender Wage Gap, 2010 INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. 1, 
available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/separate-and-not-equal-gender-
segregation-in-the-labor-market-and-the-gender-wage-gap (observing that: 
[F]our of ten women (39.7 percent) worked in female-dominated 
occupations (those where incumbents are at least 75 percent female); 
these occupations employ fewer than one in twenty men (4.5 percent; 
IWPR 2010a).  Slightly more than four of ten men (43.6 percent) and 
only 5.5 percent of all women worked in male-dominated occupations 
(those where incumbents are at least 75 percent male)  
and concluding that progress toward occupational integration “has completely 
stalled since the mid 1990s”). 
 200  See David S. Cohen, No Boy Left Behind? Single-Sex Education and the Essentialist 
Myth of Masculinity, 84 IND. L.J. 135 (2009) (detailing the different rationales and 
classroom strategies). 
 201  Id. at 153–55; see also Janna Jackson, “Dangerous Presumptions”: How Single-Sex 
Schooling Reifies False Notions of Sex, Gender, and Sexuality, 22 GENDER & EDUC. 227, 232–
33 (2010). 
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The literature from those supporting sex-segregated education 
makes these points entirely clear.  Though the proponents proudly 
highlight the stereotype-busting possibilities of sex segregation, they 
do so while infusing their work with learning strategies that are 
themselves based on stereotypes.  For instance, Leonard Sax and 
Michael Gurian have written extensively about the importance of 
teaching both boys and girls in sex-specific ways that are rooted in 
their sex-specific needs.202  These are stereotypes, pure and simple. 
Second, possibly intentionally, this argument creates too much 
room, in a culture that believes deeply in inherent differences 
between males and females, for schools to implement single-sex 
education in a way that relies on stereotypes.  Proponents of single-
sex education are quick to disclaim any interest in stereotyping boys 
and girls.  The people implementing single-sex education, however, 
are prone to do so in a way that relies on sex stereotyping.  This has 
been documented previously,203 but even more recent examples 
indicate that this risk is real and not going away. 
For instance, Pittsburgh experimented with single-sex education 
in 2011 but then stopped only months later because of problems 
related to sex stereotyping.  The Academy at Westinghouse, a public 
magnet school, began offering single-sex classes in the fall; however, 
by November, the superintendent of the Pittsburgh public school 
system decided to end the program.204  She stated that she was not 
“comfortable with some of the things that were stated to be 
characteristics of girls or characteristics of boys [during staff 
trainings].  I wasn’t comfortable with it, and I don’t think most 
people would have been.”205  In response to a records request from 
the Women’s Law Project and the ACLU of Pennsylvania, documents 
 
 202  Cohen, supra note 200, at 155–68; see, e.g., GURIAN, supra note 116; SAX, supra 
note 116.  
 203  See Cohen, supra note 200, at 168–74; see also Howard M. Glasser, Hierarchical 
Deficiencies: Constructed Differences Between Adolescent Boys and Girls in a Public School 
Single-Sex Program in the United States, 27 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 377, 395 (2012) 
(examining teaching by teachers who believe the biological differences literature and 
finding not only that a single-sex offering “constructs and endorses differences 
between the sexes that identify and position them relative to each other,” but also 
that teachers who believe strongly in differences between the sexes “reinforce and 
reify gender differences, constructing essentialized identities for boys and girls that 
could substantially affect students’ construction of self as well as a variety of outcomes 
including their academic experiences”). 
 204  Eleanor Chute, City Schools Chief Wants Single Gender Classes to End, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local 
/neighborhoods-city/city-schools-chief-wants-single-gender-classes-to-end-322809/.  
 205  Id. 
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were uncovered that indicated the school planners intended to 
emphasize “‘characteristics of warrior, protector, and provider’ for 
boys, and provid[e] ‘space/time to explore things that young women 
like [including] writing, applying and doing make-up & hair, art.’”206  
Among the materials that led to the training sessions relying on 
stereotypes was Leonard Sax’s book, Why Gender Matters.207 
Similar issues arose in Mobile, Alabama, where the school 
district also experimented with sex segregation.  There, according to 
the ACLU, teacher trainings included the following: 
[T]eachers were informed that boys should be taught about 
“heroic behavior” but that girls should learn “good 
character.”  Teachers were told that male hormone levels 
directly relate to success at “traditional male tasks” but that 
when stress levels rise in an adolescent girl’s brain, “other 
things shut down.”  A story in the Mobile Press-Register 
reported that a language arts exercise for sixth grade girls 
involved asking the girls to use as many descriptive words as 
possible to describe their dream wedding cake, while the 
boys were asked to brainstorm action verbs used in sports.  
According to Mark Jones, whose son Jacob attends Hankins 
Middle School, the school principal told him that the 
changes at Hankins were necessary because boys’ and girls’ 
brains are so different that they needed different 
curriculums.208 
In early 2009, the Mobile County school system announced that it 
had agreed with the ACLU to abandon the experiment and not 
segregate schools for at least another three years.209 
These are just two instances among many in which teachers all 
over the country are repackaging and delivering sexist stereotypes as 
they adopt sex-specific teaching methods.210 This repeated trope in 
 
 206  Sara Rose & Sue Frietsche, Following ACLU Demands Pittsburgh Ditches Single-Sex 
School Plans, ACLU (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/blog 
/womens-rights/following-aclu-demands-pittsburgh-ditches-single-sex-school-plans. 
 207  Id. 
 208  Alabama School District Agrees to End Illegal Sex Segregation, ACLU (Mar. 25, 
2009), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/alabama-school-district-agrees-end 
-illegal-sex-segregation. 
 209  Rena Havner Philips, Single-sex Classes to Be Dropped, ALA. PRESS-REG., Mar. 20, 
2009, http://www.al.com/press-register/stories/index.ssf?/base/news
/1237540592311240.xml&coll=3. 
 210  See, e.g., Kerry Fehr-Snyder, Same-Gender Classes Boost Boys at Andersen, ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Apr. 14, 2010, p. 3 (reporting about different teaching 
techniques at a middle school: “Female teachers need to be direct and speak in lower 
tones in all-boy classes . . . .  Girls learn better working in groups and having 
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the delivery of single-sex education highlights the flaw in the 
argument that breaking down stereotypes is an exceedingly 
persuasive justification for sex-segregated education.  Although 
science indicates that males and females differ more within each 
group than between the two groups,211 large segments of the 
population still believe that men and women (and boys and girls) are 
inherently different.  After all, John Gray’s books would not have 
been as popular as they were had they been called “Men and Women 
Are Both From Earth.”212  Because of the widespread belief in 
inherent differences, the segregation of boys and girls in education 
sends the message that they should be taught differently, often based 
on the pernicious stereotypes described above.213 
Therefore, although proponents of single-sex education sound 
noble in proclaiming that segregating boys and girls in school will 
lead to boys and girls breaking free from the chains of stereotypes, 
their argument is a smoke screen.  The anti-stereotyping argument 
masks a clear effort by many single-sex education proponents to 
perpetuate those stereotypes in the classroom. Moreover, sex 
segregation provides teachers and administrators with an opportunity 
to implement their own beliefs in sex stereotypes.  Like the 
arguments covered above—choice and diversity, educational 
outcomes, and brain differences—this argument to justify sex 
segregation in education is not exceedingly persuasive. 
 
choices.”); Sarah Rogers, Separate but Not Equal, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), Dec. 
7, 2011, http://www.wvgazette.com/Opinion/OpEdCommentaries/201112070317: 
Boys should be asked about what has happened in a story, while girls 
should be asked how the story made them feel.  Girls should not be 
given time limits on a test, but should be encouraged to take their 
shoes off in class because this helps them relax and think. 
Id.; Elizabeth Weil, Teaching Boys and Girls Separately, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/magazine/02sex3-t.html (quoting David 
Chadwell, the coordinator of Single-Gender Initiatives at the South Carolina 
Department of Education): 
“You need to engage boys’ energy, use it rather than trying to say, No, 
no, no.  So instead of having boys raise their hands, you’re going to 
have boys literally stand up.” . . .  For the girls, Chadwell prescribes a 
focus on “the connections girls have (a) with the content, (b) with each 
other and (c) with the teacher. . . .  So you do a lot of meeting in 
circles, where every girl can share something from her own life that 
relates to the content in class.” 
Id. 
 211  See Hyde, supra note 122, at 581; see also supra notes 1243–136 and 
accompanying text. 
 212  NANCY LEVIT, THE GENDER LINE: MEN, WOMEN, AND THE LAW 3 (1998). 
 213  Cohen, supra note 200, at 176.  
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IV. THE ESSENTIALIST PROBLEM WITH SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION 
Without an exceedingly persuasive justification, sex-segregated 
education fails constitutional scrutiny.  This section shows that sex 
segregation also fails because it furthers “overbroad generalizations 
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and 
females”214 and because it “create[s] or perpetuate[s] the legal, social, 
and economic inferiority of women.”215  Situating sex segregation of 
public schools within the context of the feminist legal theory of anti-
essentialism makes this clear.  Sex segregating public schools relies 
on and furthers an essentialist view of boys and girls, which is exactly 
what Justice Ginsburg is referring to when she decries “overbroad 
generalizations” about males and females.216  Moreover, sex 
segregation in public schools furthers male dominance, which in turn 
perpetuates the “inferiority of women.”217 
Anti-essentialism is a theory that the binary sex and gender 
categories do not truly capture people’s identities and differences but 
rather construct those identities and differences.  Anti-essentialism 
notes that there is more variation within the binary categories of 
“men” and “women” than exists between the two constructed 
categories.  This binary works to constrain identity, because people 
feel the need to confine their behaviors and personalities to what is 
socially acceptable for people of their sex.  Anti-essentialism, on the 
other hand, refuses to label any particular characteristic as more 
appropriate for one sex than the other; thus, men can have 
masculine or feminine traits, just as women can have masculine or 
feminine traits.  In fact, anti-essentialism challenges the idea of any 
set masculinity or femininity in the first place.218 
In this sense, anti-essentialism is consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s concerns in its sex segregation cases.  By focusing so clearly, 
as Justice Ginsburg did in VMI, on “overbroad generalizations” and 
 
 214  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). 
 215  Id. at 534. 
 216  Id. at 533. 
 217  See, e.g., Christopher John Greig, Boy-Only Classrooms: Gender Reform in Windsor, 
Ontario 1966-1972, 63 EDUC. REV. 127, 139 (2011) (finding no academic advantages 
for boys in single-sex classes and concluding that “boy-only settings may promote, 
legitimate, and reinforce dominant constructions of masculinity that serve to 
exacerbate the problem of male violence.  In the Flintridge case, boys from the boy-
only classes became more aggressive and developed misogynist attitudes.”). 
 218  See generally Cohen, supra note 117, at 135–38. 
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stereotyping, the Supreme Court has sent a clear message that the 
state cannot rely on essentialist views of how men and women (or 
boys and girls) are or are supposed to behave.  Mary Ann Case has 
called this the idea of the “perfect proxy.”  She claims that the only 
way the Constitution will allow a sex classification is if “the sex-
respecting rule [is] true of either all women or no women or all men 
or no men; there must be a zero or a hundred on one side of the sex 
equation or the other.”219 
As already demonstrated in the earlier discussion about 
stereotyping, single-sex education relies on and allows for the 
exploitation of embedded sex stereotyping.  As the implementation 
of single-sex education220 as well as the arguments for it that come 
from its strongest proponents make entirely clear,221 without sex 
stereotyping, there would be no single-sex education.  From these 
sources, what emerges is that those pushing and implementing single-
sex education rely on a fairly consistent set of “overbroad 
generalizations” about how boys and girls are and behave: boys and 
girls are heterosexual; boys are stoic, girls are emotional; boys are 
competitive, girls are cooperative; boys like sports, girls like anything 
but; boys are aggressive and active, girls are passive; and most 
important, boys are not girls or girl-like and girls are not boys or boy-
like.222 
This problem is not merely a problem with the particular group 
of people currently advocating for or implementing single-sex 
education.  Rather, it is inherent to the very idea of sex-segregated 
education.  Thus, essentialism is an inevitable result of sex 
segregation. 
If separating boys and girls in school based on sex is a good idea, 
it must be because there is something different about boys and girls 
 
 219  Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1449–50 
(2000).  She continues: 
Even a generalization demonstrably true of an overwhelming majority 
of one sex or the other does not suffice to overcome the presumption 
of unconstitutionality the Court has attached to sex-respecting rules: 
virtually every sex-respecting rule struck down by the Court in the last 
quarter century embodied a proxy that was overwhelmingly, though 
not perfectly, accurate. 
Id. at 1450. 
 220  Cohen, supra note 200, at 149–51. 
 221  Id. at 172–74. 
 222  Id. at 153–68. 
LEVIT/COHEN (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014  12:06 PM 
386 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:339 
 
that is relevant to their ability to learn.223  Regardless of whether the 
program is being implemented by the most forward-thinking equality-
believing educator, that very basis for separating the sexes is 
inconsistent with constitutional guarantees against sex stereotyping.  
Given that generalized physiological and psychological differences 
between boys and girls are dwarfed by their similarities,224 any notion 
of what it is that differs between boys and girls is going to rely on and 
perpetuate essentialist ideas of sex and gender or, in the words of 
Justice Ginsburg, “overbroad generalizations.”  For instance, 
undoubtedly some boys may be more competitive and more 
interested in sports than girls.  A teacher may want to exploit these 
interests in teaching those boys.  The problem, though, is that not all 
boys are going to fit that characterization.  For those boys, separation 
is going to work against their interests. 
The proponent of single-sex education may respond to this 
argument by saying that boys who do fit within these generalizations 
should be able to choose to be in an all-boys class.  But, that ignores 
the girls who fit within this generalization about boys.225  Certainly, 
some girls are going to learn better in, to continue with the example 
here, a competitive environment that is based on sports.  For those 
girls, not being in the boys’ class that is geared toward competitive 
learning is going to harm their education.  Likewise, for those girls, 
being in the girls’ class that teaches without competition is going to 
be harmful. 
Research from many disciplines clearly proves that sex 
segregation causes even more harmful stereotyping of boys and girls.  
This occurs through a predictable psychological process.  When two 
groups are separated, the “outgroup homogeneity effect” causes the 
ingroup to perceive that those who are not a part of that group are all 
the same.  Working along with the outgroup homogeneity effect is 
the concept known as “groupthink,” which results in the people 
within the ingroup believing in the same things as one another and 
 
 223  If there is no difference between the two groups, then splitting them based on 
sex is arbitrary and a violation of basic principles stemming from the very beginning 
of the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence.  See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 
(1971) (“The Equal Protection Clause . . . does, however, deny to States the power to 
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that 
statute.”). 
 224  See supra notes 123–36 and accompanying text.  
 225  See, e.g., EILEEN MCDONAGH & LAURA PAPPANO, PLAYING WITH THE BOYS: WHY 
SEPARATE IS NOT EQUAL IN SPORTS 39–75 (2008). 
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ignoring or squelching dissenting opinions.226 
These basic psychological processes that occur when boys and 
girls are separated based on the fact that they are boys and girls 
would increase stereotyping rather than decrease it.  Sex-segregated 
boys would believe that all girls are the same, and sex-segregated girls 
would believe that all boys are the same (the outgroup homogeneity 
effect).  The sex-segregated boys would also believe that they are all 
the same as one another rather than see their own differences, as 
would the sex-segregated girls (groupthink).  This is sex stereotyping 
pure and simple. 
This theoretical description of how stereotyping works in 
segregated groups has been found to occur repeatedly in the context 
of educational sex segregation.227  Most prominently, in a California 
experiment in the late 1990s, researchers found that sex-segregated 
schools increased students’ and teachers’ stereotyped beliefs about 
sex and gender, gave them ready outlets for expressing those 
stereotypes, and created a sense of opposition between boys and 
girls.228  In 2011, a group of researchers published a summary of the 
research about sex segregation and stereotyping in Science magazine, 
concluding that there “is evidence that sex segregation increases 
gender stereotyping and legitimizes institutional sexism.”229 
Two of the most recent studies to this effect were both published 
in 2013.  Both confirmed the theory that segregation causes 
stereotyping and the previous studies in a much more direct inquiry 
into the matter.  In the first, researchers studied “a public junior high 
school in the southwestern USA that offered both co-educational and 
[sex segregated] classes.”230  The researchers looked directly at 
whether students who were in sex-segregated classes held more 
stereotypical beliefs about sex and gender than those who were not.  
The school they studied randomly assigned 365 seventh graders (181 
girls, 184 boys) into coeducational or sex-segregated classes.  The 
overall schedule for the students studied varied from zero to eight 
 
 226  See David S. Cohen, Keeping Men “Men” and Women Down: Sex-Segregation, Anti-
Essentialism, and Masculinity, 33 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 509, 545–46 (2010).  
 227  See id. at 545–49.  
 228  DATNOW ET AL., supra note 149, at 50; Elisabeth L. Woody, Constructions of 
Masculinity in California’s Single-Gender Academies, in GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON SINGLE-SEX AND COEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLING 280, 285 (Amanda 
Datnow & Lee Hubbard eds., 2002). 
 229  Halpern et al., supra note 123, at 1706.  
 230  Richard A. Fabes et al., Gender-Segregated Schooling and Gender Stereotyping, EDUC. 
STUDIES 2 (2013). 
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sex-segregated classes over the course of the school year.  The 
researchers asked the students to fill out a questionnaire twice during 
the school year, once in August and again in May.  The questionnaire 
asked “who is better at math” and “who is better at language arts,” 
with the options being boys, girls, or neither.231 
The results of the study confirmed the theory advanced here and 
indicated that segregation of classes based on sex results in more 
stereotypical views based on sex.  Controlling for sex-stereotyped 
beliefs in the beginning of the school year, the researchers found that 
there was a “14% increase in the odds of responding in a stereotypic 
manner for a one-unit increase in [sex segregated] classes.”  This 
effect was compounded based on the number of classes, so that a 
student taking the maximum of eight sex-segregated classes had a 
“112% increase in the odds of responding in a gender-stereotypic 
manner to the questions relative to students who did not have any 
[sex segregated] classes.”  The researchers concluded that sex-
segregated classes “led to increases in later stereotypic beliefs beyond 
the students’ initial levels.”  In their analysis, they stated that their 
findings directly contradict the anti-stereotyping argument of single-
sex education proponents: 
Thus, despite adults’ best intentions to use [sex-segregated] 
classrooms to create environments that promote equity and 
enhance academic and social skills for all children, the 
present findings provide evidence that placing students in 
[sex-segregated] classes strengthens rather than reduces 
students’ gender-stereotypic beliefs.  Moreover, these 
findings revealed that the more [sex-segregated] classes 
students took, the more gender-stereotyped they became.232 
The second study reached similar conclusions by looking at 
single-sex girls’ schools in Colombia.233  The study looked at 469 
fourth, fifth, and sixth grade girls; about 70% attended single-sex 
schools, while the other 30% attended mixed-sex schools.234  The 
researchers gave the students a short self-assessment about their 
gender identity.235  The findings provide further evidence that single-
sex schooling exacerbates stereotypes rather than breaking them 
 
 231  Id. 
 232  Id. at 3–4. 
 233  Kate Drury et al., Victimization and Gender Identity in Single-Sex and Mixed-Sex 
Schools: Examining Contextual Variations in Pressure to Conform to Gender Norms, 69 SEX 
ROLES 442 (2013). 
 234  Id. at 447. 
 235  Id.  
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down. 
In particular, the researchers found that pressure to conform to 
gender stereotypes was higher in single-sex environments.236  They 
concluded that “spending more time with same-gender peers leads to 
increased feelings of pressure to conform to gender norms and 
higher levels of gender typicality.”237  In contrast, “girls in the mixed-
sex environment rated themselves as less typical and as feeling less 
pressure to conform to gender norms.”238  Perhaps most troubling was 
the study’s finding that in single-sex schools “being a typical girl 
protects you from victimization, and conversely, being atypical places 
you at risk for peer victimization.”239  The study found no association 
between gender typicality and peer victimization in mixed-sex 
schools.240  Thus, this study tells us that single-sex schools not only 
produce more gender typical students than mixed-sex schools but 
also that, unlike in mixed-sex schools, this gender typicality is 
reinforced through the threat of peer victimization. 
Ultimately, if the idea is that some students learn better being 
taught in a particular way—with, for instance, more exercise or 
greater interpersonal support woven in—then educators need to 
figure out how to do that without separating based on some other 
characteristic, a characteristic rendered suspect by the Constitution.  
Educators can identify  students who learn in a particular way and 
teach those students in that fashion, based on those learning 
patterns.  Or, educators need to figure out a way to incorporate 
different teaching methods into a group that has different learning 
needs.  Grouping students based on their presumed genitalia is a 
highly over- and under-inclusive way of achieving the universally 
desired goal of better education because it exacerbates exactly what 
Justice Ginsburg warned against—overbroad stereotypes about boys 
and girls.241 
Anti-essentialism also addresses the other concern raised by 
Justice Ginsburg—that sex classifications not reinforce notions of the 
inferiority of women.  Anti-essentialism is not merely a theory about 
identity but also is a theory about the way that constructed identity 
 
 236  Id. at 450. 
 237  Id. 
 238  Id.  
 239  Drury et al., supra note 233, at 451. 
 240  Id. 
 241  The Court has consistently decried overbroad stereotypes because they harm 
almost everyone involved.  See Cohen, supra note 200, at 170–74 (describing in detail 
the harms that flow from stereotyping based on sex). 
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reinforces power differentials that already exist in society.  Essentialist 
notions of sex and gender create, normalize, and reinforce power 
differentials between men and women as well as power differentials 
among men. This essentialized notion of how men and women are 
supposed to behave not only restricts identity (as discussed earlier) 
but also furthers patriarchy. 
An example of this exact problem can be found in an 
experiment with sex segregation in Detroit in the early 1990s.  By 
creating a school that focused on the problems of African American 
boys, the city ignored African American girls.  As the district judge 
who found the program unconstitutional pointed out, “[t]here is no 
evidence that the educational system is failing urban males because 
females attend schools with males.  In fact, the educational system is 
also failing females.”242  By ignoring the concerns of urban females, 
the system furthered male dominance. 
In fact, the expansion of sex-segregated education over the past 
decade indicates that this reification of hierarchy is an essential part 
of the sex segregation movement.  In 1992, the American Association 
of University Women issued its landmark report entitled “How 
Schools Shortchange Girls.”243  The report detailed how girls had 
fallen behind boys, had been discriminated against, and were 
generally suffering in school.  Yet, there was no expansion of sex-
segregated education as a result.  In the 2000s, however, as boys 
became the focus of the national conversation about failing schools, 
sex segregation blossomed.244  People like those already described in 
this essay, Michael Gurian and Leonard Sax, focused on the boy crisis 
and supposed boy needs.  Thus, these advocates were able to garner 
the attention of policy-makers and school superintendents, and we 
have now seen the explosion of single-sex education.  By focusing on 
improving the lot of boys and previously ignoring girls’ problems, the 
sex segregation movement showed its true colors. 
Individual stories of schools focused on boys along with the 
questionable motives of modern reformers is indicative of the 
inescapable larger problem—that sex segregation, by definition, 
reifies existing sex-based hierarchies.  The recent article from Science 
magazine referenced above, which summarized what we know about 
separating children based on sex, emphasized this point.  The 
 
 242  Garrett v. Bd. of Educ., 775 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
 243  AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOW SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS: 
A STUDY OF MAJOR FINDINGS ON GIRLS AND EDUCATION (1992). 
 244  See Cohen, supra note 200. 
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authors reviewed studies on the subject and concluded that “gender 
divisions are made even more salient in [single-sex] settings because 
the contrast between the segregated classroom and the mixed-sex 
structure of the surrounding world provides evidence to children that 
sex is a core human characteristic along which adults organize 
education.”245 
Given that students attending sex-segregated classes or schools 
live in a world with sex divisions and hierarchies already firmly 
entrenched, segregated classes will work to ossify those divisions and 
hierarchies.  Students in those classes will see that the division means 
something and will carry this understanding outside the classroom.  
The research summarized by the Science authors demonstrates how 
this works.  Research has shown that, within an already sex-
stereotyped world, “[b]oys who spend more time with other boys 
become increasingly aggressive, and certain boys experience greater 
risk for behavior problems because they spend more time with boys.  
Similarly, girls who spend more time with other girls become more 
sex-typed.”246  These stereotyped behaviors are associated with sex-
based hierarchies, which sex-segregated education will reify. 
Moreover, by the very act of separation, students will develop 
biases that they are superior and the other group is inferior.  This 
process, the “ingroup superiority effect,” results in the ingroup 
believing that its members are superior to those who are not a part of 
the ingroup.247  In the context of sex-segregated education, 
researchers have found these effects to exist and posit that they are 
even more likely to exist “when sex is used to divide children into 
entirely separate classrooms or schools rather than merely into 
separate lines to go to lunch.”248  On the other hand, “[p]ositive and 
cooperative interaction with members of other groups is an effective 
method for improving intergroup relationships.”249 
Broadening the disciplinary context, cross-cultural research has 
 
 245  Halpern et al., supra note 123, at 1707; Single-sex Schooling Does Not Improve 
Performance and Can Lead to Gender Stereotyping, Study Finds, SCIENCEDAILY, Sept. 3, 
2011, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/09/110922141902.htm 
(According to Richard Fabes, director of Arizona State University’s School of Social 
and Family Dynamics, “[s]eparating boys and girls in public school classrooms makes 
gender very salient, and this salience reinforces stereotypes and sexism.”); see also 
Carol Lynn Martin & Richard A. Fabes, The Stability and Consequences of Young 
Children’s Same-Sex Peer Interactions, 37 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 431 (2001).   
 246  Halpern et al., supra note 123, at 1707. 
 247  See Cohen, supra note 226, at 545–46.  
 248  Id.  
 249  Id. 
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shown that sex segregation leads to the reification of hierarchy.  
Architectural theorist Daphne Spain has studied sex segregation 
across cultures and found when sex segregation is pronounced in a 
culture, men occupy a higher, more powerful status than women.  In 
a patriarchal society, this effect of sex segregation is even more 
pronounced.  She writes that in such a society where men hold more 
power than women, “the physical separation of women and men . . . 
contributes to and perpetuates gender stratification.”250  She argues 
that “[w]hen gender segregation is imposed by custom or law [], it 
typically operates to maintain the privileges of those with the highest 
status.”251  In a world without sex and gender-based hierarchies, 
“[s]patial arrangements might not be associated with gender 
stratification . . . .  Yet that rarely is the case.  The ‘masculine 
knowledge’ conveyed in schools and workplaces is typically granted 
higher status than the ‘feminine knowledge’ associated with the 
dwelling.”252 
Because at its root it is a form of sex and gender essentialism, 
sex-segregated education falls prey to the very problems that Justice 
Ginsburg identified in VMI.  By separating boys from girls, single-sex 
education relies upon and exacerbates “outdated stereotypes” while it 
also “create[s] [and] perpetuate[s] the legal, social, and economic 
inferiority of women.”253 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We are over seven years into an unconstitutional experiment 
that is promising a false bill of goods to parents and children and 
delivering significant damage in the form of stereotypes and sexism.  
Parents are told they have a choice of more diverse options for their 
children, but instead their children are coerced into accepting an 
unconstitutional education.  Students are promised better 
educational outcomes but no evidence backs that up.  Advocates rely 
on discredited brain science that is in actuality another way to 
promote and encourage stereotyped learning.  The effect is not that 
students learn better but rather that they believe and act more 
stereotypically based on sex while also furthering existing sex-based 
hierarchies. 
 
 250  Daphne Spain, Gendered Spaces and Women’s Status, 11 SOC. THEORY 137, 137 
(1993). 
 251  Id. at 141. 
 252  Id. at 140. 
 253  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533–34 (1996). 
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In other words, sex-segregated education is patently 
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  It has 
no “exceedingly persuasive justification” and instead exacerbates 
“outdated stereotypes” while “creat[ing] [and] perpetuat[ing] the 
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”254  It is time for the 
nation’s judges and educators to stop this unconstitutional 
experiment. 
 
 
 254  Id. 
